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You’ve Got to Be Kidneying Me! 
THE FATAL PROBLEM OF SEVERING RIGHTS AND 
REMEDIES FROM THE BODY OF ORGAN DONATION LAW 
Death is unique. It is unlike aught else in its certainty and its incidents. A 
corpse in some respects is the strangest thing on earth. A man who but 
yesterday breathed, and thought, and walked among us has passed away. 
Something has gone. The body is left still and cold, and is all that is visible to 
mortal eye of the man we knew. Around it cling love and memory. Beyond it 
may reach hope. It must be laid away. And the law—that rule of action which 
touches all human things—must touch also this thing of death. It is not 
surprising that the law relating to this mystery of what death leaves behind can 
not be precisely brought within the letter of all the rules regarding corn, lumber, 
and pig-iron.1 
“I’d give my left kidney to meet Sean Connery . . . ,” and who 
wouldn’t? Clearly this statement is understood to refer to the declarant’s 
passionate desire to become acquainted with an aged celebrity, and 
certainly not as a literal offer to exchange a kidney for what admittedly 
would be an amazing experience. But what if I really did give my left 
kidney to meet Sir Sean Connery, and while we were visiting he were to 
say, “I’d give my right kidney to play James Bond again.” Applying 
common idiomatic knowledge, one should reasonably conclude that Mr. 
Connery is whimsically wishing he were not so old, not proposing a 
potentially illegal transaction.2 But what if during our visit Sir Sean 
Connery were to say, in reference to his good friend Sir Roger Moore, 
“I’d give him a kidney”? Again, it is unlikely that one would take Sir 
Sean Connery’s proposition literally, but rather a reasonable observer 
would conclude that Sean Connery’s statement refers to his intense 
friendship with Sir Roger Moore. But what if these statements went 
beyond the idiotic and idiomatic and were all reasonably understood as 
literal expressions of legitimate subjective desires? 
To take the hypothetical one step further, suppose that Sir Sean 
Connery (“Connery”) moves to New York and Sir Roger Moore 
(“Moore”) moves to Florida.3 Moore, at eighty years of age, is in dire 
  
 
1
 Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr. Inc., 527 S.E.2d 240, 243 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting 
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 123 Ga. 62, 63 (1905)). 
 
2
 See infra Part I.B (discussing illegal intransfers).  
 
3
 The following facts are adapted from: Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc. 
(Colavito I), 356 F. Supp. 2d 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 486 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2007); Colavito v. 
N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc. (Colavito II), 438 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2006), certifying questions to 
860 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 2006); and Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc. (Colavito III), 860 
N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 2006) (certified question). Robert Colavito was on a waiting list for a kidney 
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need of a kidney transplant. Connery promises Moore that he can have 
his kidneys upon his death. Upon Connery’s death, Connery’s wife, Lady 
Connery, a French artist also known by the name of Micheline 
Roquebrune (“Micheline”), fills out the requisite forms in order to direct 
a donation of Connery’s kidneys to Moore consistent with Connery’s 
wishes. Upon Connery’s death, the New York Organ Donor Network 
(“NYODN”) immediately transports Connery’s left kidney to Florida for 
transplantation. Moore is immediately notified and prepped for the 
transplantation by Moore’s surgeon, Dr. No. Upon examining the kidney, 
however, Dr. No realizes that it has been irreparably damaged and is 
unsuitable for transplantation. Contrary to Micheline’s wishes, the right 
kidney remained in New York. Dr. No immediately contacted the 
NYODN to request the other kidney, but unfortunately for Moore, the 
kidney had already been transplanted into another patient. 
What are Moore and Micheline’s cognizable legal claims in this 
situation? What remedies are available? What if it were subsequently 
discovered that Connery’s kidneys were incompatible with Moore, such 
that neither kidney could have been successfully transplanted?4 What if 
the NYODN’s actions were taken under the direction of a county 
coroner?5 While this hypothetical may appear ridiculous on its face, it is 
based on a real-life set of facts.6 In Colavito v. New York Organ Donor 
Network, Inc., Mr. Colavito (played by Mr. Moore in our hypothetical) 
sued for relief7 but died while waiting for another kidney, not even 
surviving long enough to witness the eventual dismissal of his lawsuit.8 
While Moore’s situation seems unique, the final resolution of his 
situation is not. An average of seventeen people die daily, waiting in vain 
  
transplant. Colavito I, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 238. Peter Lucia, a good friend of Colavito, passed away 
and his widow directed a donation of both kidneys to Colavito. Id. at 238-39. One of Lucia’s kidneys 
was sent from New York to Colavito in Florida; however, the New York Organ Donation Network 
(“NYODN”), despite Lucia’s widow’s wishes to the contrary, allocated the other kidney to a 
recipient in New York. See id. at 239-40. Upon arrival of Lucia’s kidney to Florida, and after 
Colavito had been fully prepped for the transplant surgery, the surgeon discovered that the kidney 
had been irreparably damaged. See id. at 239. Subsequently it was discovered that Lucia’s kidney 
was incompatible with Colavito, and even had the kidney been in good condition, the organ would 
not have been of use to Colavito. See id. at 240. After dismissal of Colavito’s claims at the district 
court level, in part because of public policy against “broad property rights in the body of a 
deceased,” Colavito appealed to the second circuit. Id. at 246-48; Colavito II, 438 F.3d at 216. The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit left open the possibility of relief, but due to several unclear 
questions of state law, specifically property interests in the body and state statutory interpretation, 
the second circuit certified a question the N.Y. Court of Appeals on these issues. Id. at 216-17. The 
Court of Appeals disposed of the question on the narrow issue of incompatibility. See Colavito III, 
860 N.E.2d at 719-22. More detailed analysis of Colavito’s claims and the courts’ treatment of those 
claims is discussed in detail throughout this Note. 
 
4
 See Colavito III, 860 N.E.2d at 719-22 (finding no cause of action under New York law). 
 
5
 See infra Part II.C. 
 
6
 See supra note 3. 
 
7
 Colavito I, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 238. 
 
8
 See Colavito II, 486 F.3d at 79 n.1. 
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for needed organs.9 These tragedies are preventable, and as post-mortem, 
directed donations comprise an increasingly important segment of the 
organ donation system in the United States, the uncertainty surrounding 
the enforceability of directed donations will become an increasingly 
important impediment to the resolution of the growing organ deficit.10 
Approaching the problem from the legal realist school of thought, the 
existence of rights for those involved in the organ donation process is 
wholly dependent upon, and indeed is defined by, the extent to which the 
law provides a meaningful remedy for the protection or assertion of these 
rights.11 Therefore, the absence of substantive legal remedies for organ 
donors, donees, and their families directly calls into question whether 
rights to these organs exist at all.12 The absence of these rights may deter 
potential donees and undermine the integrity of the organ donation 
system in the United States.13 Alternatively, increasing the rights of 
donors, donees, and their families will lead to more efficient allocation of 
organs, encourage donation, and reduce the growing waitlists of those in 
need of life-saving organ transplants.14 
This Note specifically addresses the deficiencies and, in some 
cases, the utter lack of remedies currently available to plaintiffs asserting 
valid claims to the organs of a cadaveric organ donor, its effects on organ 
donation generally, and potential solutions to the problem. Part I of this 
Note examines the common law history and evolution of property in 
deceased bodies, as well as modern statutory schemes regulating organ 
donation and procurement. Part II outlines the scope of enforceable 
rights in post-mortem organs, or rather the lack thereof, through actual 
and potential remedies to vindicate such rights. The analysis focuses on 
the failures of both the courts and the legislatures to directly address this 
growing problem. Finally, Part III of this Note highlights the potentially 
tragic effects of poorly defined rights in deceased bodies and explores 
potential solutions to the dilemma. 
  
 
9
 Sean Arthurs, No More Circumventing the Dead: The Least-Cost Model Congress 
Should Adopt to Address the Abject Failure of Our National Organ Donation Regime, 73 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1101, 1101 (2005); see also National Kidney Foundation, 25 Facts About Organ Donation and 
Transplantation, ¶ 2, http://www.kidney.org/news/newsroom/printfact.cfm?id=30 (last visited Sept. 
13, 2008); Ann McIntosh, Comment, Regulating the “Gift of Life”—The 1987 Uniform Anatomical 
Gift Act, 65 WASH. L. REV. 171, 185 (1990) (“Although the number of potential cadaveric donors 
each year is difficult to estimate, studies often find that number could provide enough transplant 
organs to meet or exceed the demand.”). 
 
10
 See infra Part III.A-B. 
 
11
 See K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS 
STUDY 84 (1930); see also Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation 
for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 679-80 (2005). 
 
12
 See supra note 11. 
 
13
 See infra Part III.A. 
 
14
 See infra Part III.B. 
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I.  UBI JURIS UBI REMEDIUM: RIGHTS? YOU’RE DEAD WRONG  
 Currently, the remedies available to enforce the rights of organ 
donors and organ donees are inadequate. In order to understand the 
current state of organ donation law, a brief history of the law of property 
in the body and the influence it has on the common law today is 
instructive. Additionally, analysis of the current federal and state 
statutory law governing the organ donation process reveals the lack of 
enforceable remedies for donors and donees.  
A. The Uncommon Law of Corpses 
The primary complication to legal ownership of a body part is 
that it is part of a body, and the law of property in the body is anything 
but certain.15 The earliest common law pronouncement concerning 
property interests in the deceased comes from a fifteenth century English 
opinion that set forth the general rule that there can be no property in a 
corpse.16 This general rule, based upon questionable foundations,17 has 
been reinforced, repeated, and misapplied in subsequent cases and 
treatises,18 despite the fact that an absolutist position against the 
recognition of property in a corpse has been widely criticized by scholars 
and often by judges applying the rule themselves.19 Judges confronted 
with this conflict have generally preferred bending the common law rule 
  
 
15
 Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr. Inc., 527 S.E.2d 240, 240-43 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). 
 
16
 See Haynes’s Case, 12 Co. Rep. 113, 113 (1614).  
 
17
 See Roger S. Magnusson, The Recognition of Proprietary Rights in Human Tissue in 
Common Law Jurisdictions, 18 MELB. U.L. REV. 601, 603 (1992) (suggesting that the oft cited edict 
that there is no property in a corpse is a misquoted statement from Haynes’s Case); see also Kathryn 
Lewis, Hands Off My Kidney! Who Owns a Donated Organ? SLATE, Dec. 26, 2006, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2156220 (same). In Haynes, a grave robber was accused of stealing sheets 
in which human corpses were wrapped. Haynes, 12 Co. Rep. at 113. Magnusson and others argue 
that the case really stands for nothing more than the proposition that there can be no property in a 
corpse, meaning that corpses cannot own anything, and that it has been incorrectly cited for the 
proposition that corpses are not property. See, e.g., Magnusson, supra, at 603. 
 
18
 The British courts widely “accept that, however questionable the historical origins of 
the principle, it has now been the common law for 150 years at least that neither a corpse nor parts of 
a corpse are in themselves and without more capable of being property protected by rights.” Regina 
v Kelly, [1999] Q.B. 621, 630-31. 
 
19
 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 509 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., 
dissenting). In Moore, plaintiff had his spleen removed at the Medical Center of the University of 
California, Los Angeles. Id. at 481. University researchers failed to inform Moore that his cells were 
very unique and very valuable for research and commercial purposes. Id. The University 
subsequently developed a cell-line from Moore’s cells with potential value in the billions of dollars. 
Id. at 481-82. In dismissing the conversion suit on a variety of grounds, the majority held that only 
property can be converted, and that Moore has no property interest in his genetic materials. Id. at 
488-89. Justice Mosk, in criticizing the majority’s invocation of the rule that there is no property 
rights in the human body in order to dismiss the conversion claim, argued in favor of applying a 
“bundle of rights” theory of property in the body. Id. at 509. Mosk further argued that statutory 
restrictions on property in the body may diminish the right without extinguishing it. Id. at 510. 
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with creative exceptions rather than attempting to straighten out its 
doctrinal foundations.20 
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, partly in 
response to the increased value of bodies and body parts in medicine and 
science,21 courts responded to these changes as they were faced with 
more legal challenges and the demand for corpses increased.22 The courts 
in both the United States and England moved in two directions: 
(1) protecting the rights of the deceased by creating a so called “quasi-
property right” which vests in the next of kin;23 and (2) creating 
exceptions acknowledging the property rights of scientists and 
researchers to lawfully obtained cadavers for exhibitions and medical 
research.24 While the legal rights extended to researchers and scientists 
were expanded to convert corpses to chattel,25 parallel developments in 
the law governing the next-of-kin “quasi-property” right remained 
extremely limited and were often stated to be nothing more than a right 
and corresponding duty to bury or dispose of a body.26 The remedies 
available for families to enforce these rights were correspondingly 
narrow.27 
A second field of judicial innovation developed at the turn of the 
century in the field of tort law. Prior to the recognition of a cause of 
  
 
20
 See Richard Taylor, Human Property: Threat or Saviour, 9 MURDOCK U. ELEC. J.L. 
¶¶ 9-38 (2002), available at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v9n4/taylor94.txt (detailing 
examples of exceptions to the general prohibition against property in the body, including exceptions 
for the next of kin, medical cadavers, biotechnology, and museum exhibitions). 
 
21
 See In re Johnson’s Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85-86 (1938).  
 
22
 Id. at 86. 
 
23
 See, e.g., Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr. Inc., 527 S.E.2d 240, 243-44 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1999) (“The quasi-property right in a corpse is not pecuniary in nature, nor should it be. The right 
encompasses only the power to ensure that the corpse is orderly handled and laid to rest, nothing 
more.”). 
 
24
 See Taylor, supra note 20, ¶¶ 20-23. 
 
25
 Id. This approach may be justified under a Lockean labor theory, specifically the law 
of accession, where mixing labor with another’s property to greatly enhance the value of the 
property deprives the original possessor of ownership. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 14 (6th 
ed. 2006). The labor theory, rather ironically premised on ownership of one’s own body, tends to 
work in favor of those who would put organs to scientific use and against a family member who does 
not want labor to be mixed with the organs of the deceased and against putative organ donees who 
have yet to expend any labor. Id. The law of accession also presents interesting damages issues, 
although the courts can generally avoid these issues by invoking the common law rule that there are 
no property rights in a corpse, thereby completely avoiding the question of whether there has been 
harm committed to one’s property. See also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 
488-89 (Cal. 1990) (finding no “ownership or right of possession” in cells removed from a patient’s 
body based in part on “no reported judicial decision support[ing the] claim, either directly or by 
close analogy”) (emphasis omitted); Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. 
L. REV. 359, 367-68 (2000).  
 
26
 See Bauer, 527 S.E.2d at 244. 
 
27
 See Grad v. Kaasa, 314 S.E.2d 755, 758 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (right to the claim of 
“wrongful autopsy” based in a quasi-property right vesting in the next of kin). But see Scarpaci v. 
Milwaukee County, 292 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Wis. 1980) (upholding an action for “wrongful autopsy” 
while rejecting that such a right is based on a property theory); Snyder v. Holy Cross, 352 A.2d 334, 
341 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (finding that the state had a compelling state interest in performing 
an autopsy on a boy who died without cause despite objections by his Orthodox Jewish father). 
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action for pure emotional distress under tort law, the courts satisfied the 
traditional requirement of physical harm as a prerequisite for damages28 
by recognizing a “quasi-property right” in a corpse where the corpse was 
negligently mishandled or defaced.29 Modern courts generally recognize 
this property interest as a legal fiction,30 although it did provide tangible 
remedies to plaintiffs seeking vindication of post-mortem wrongs.31 
B. Life, Death, Transplantation, and Legislation 
Against this uncertain background of corporeal property law, the 
first successful organ transplant took place in 1954.32 Since that time both 
the effectiveness of transplantation as well as the need for viable organs 
have substantially increased.33 This ever-increasing demand contributes 
to the ever-increasing shortage of organs and ever-increasing waitlists for 
potential organ recipients.34 The legal response to this phenomenon has 
  
 
28
 See Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.C. 577, 598 (1861) (“Mental pain or anxiety the law 
cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that 
alone . . . .”). 
 
29
 See Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass’n, 17 P.2d 535, 536-37 (Colo. 1932) 
(awarding damages for emotional distress while recognizing that “insult and indignity . . . inflict no 
injury on the dead, but they can visit agony akin to torture on the living”); see also Christensen v. 
Super. Ct., 820 P.2d 181, 183 (Cal. 1991) (finding that close family members may recover for 
emotional distress for an action based on negligent mishandling of a loved one’s remains). 
 
30
 Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc. (Colavito I), 356 F. Supp. 2d 237, 356 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 486 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In most [cases involving the mishandling of 
dead bodies], the courts have talked of a somewhat dubious ‘property right’ to the body, usually in 
the next of kin, which did not exist while the decedent was living, cannot be conveyed, can be used 
only for the one purpose of burial, and not only has no pecuniary value but is a source of liability for 
funeral expenses. It seems reasonably obvious that such ‘property’ is something evolved out of thin 
air to meet the occasion, and that it is in reality the personal feelings of the survivors which are being 
protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer.”) (quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, THE 
LAW OF TORTS 58-59 (4th ed. 1971)).  
 
31
 Quasi-property rights provide a remedy which is in and of itself a recognition of a right:  
  
“Quasi property” seems to be . . . simply another convenient “hook” upon which liability is 
hung,—merely a phrase covering up and concealing the real basis for damages, which is 
mental anguish. The plaintiff, in these actions, does not seek to vindicate any “quasi-
property” right. He sues simply because of the mental suffering and anguish that he has 
undergone from the realization that disrespect and indignities have been heaped upon the 
body of one who was close to him in life.  
 
Note, Damages: Pleading Property: Who May Recover for Wrongful Disturbance of a Dead 
Body, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 108, 110 (1933) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
32
 Erik S. Jaffe, Note, She’s got Betty Davis’[s] Eyes: Assessing the Nonconsensual 
Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Taking and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528, 
530 & n.8 (1990). 
 
33
 National Kidney Foundation, 25 Facts About Organ Donation and Transplantation, 
http://www.kidney.org/news/newsroom/fsitem.cfm?id=30 (last visited Sept. 13, 2008). 
 
34
 The United Network for Organ Sharing maintains a running count of waitlist 
candidates. The United Network for Organ Sharing, Data: Waiting List Candidates, www.unos.org 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2009). As of February 1, 2009, the count was at 100,679. Id.  
2009] ORGAN DONATION RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 549 
 
occurred primarily through legislative rather than judicial reform.35 In 
1968, in an attempt to address growing concerns surrounding organ 
procurement, the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform 
State Laws (“NCCUSL”) promulgated the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
(“UAGA”).36 The UAGA has been adopted in one form or another by all 
fifty states.37  
The UAGA’s purpose is to promote organ donation while 
attempting to balance the rights and interests of the deceased and their 
families with both the interests of the state and the societal need for post-
mortem donations and scientific research.38 The UAGA applies only to 
post-mortem donations and allows adults to consent to donation 
generally or to a specified donor.39 Significantly, the UAGA requires that 
post-mortem organ donations be made as gifts, expressly prohibiting 
“valuable consideration” in exchange for an organ donation.40 The 
UAGA does not expressly govern the inter vivos transfer of organs. 
Also, under the 1968 UAGA, most states permitted the surviving family 
members to override a donor’s wishes upon death,41 which remains a 
reality today in many states.42 
  
 
35
 Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 498 (Cal. 1990) (Arabian, J., 
concurring opinion) (finding that resolution of who owns human biological material is better suited 
to legislative rather than judicial reform); see infra Part II.A.2. 
 
36
 McIntosh, supra note 9, at 172; UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987), 8A U.L.A. 17 
(2003).  
 
37
 Id.  
 
38
 Colavito III, 860 N.E.2d at 713, 720. The Colavito court, quoting the prefatory note to 
the UAGA, notes that the competing interests are:  
(1) the wishes of the deceased during his lifetime concerning the disposition of his body; 
(2) the desires of the surviving spouse or next of kin; (3) the interest of the state in 
determining by autopsy, the cause of death in cases involving crime or violence; (4) the 
need of autopsy to determine the cause of death when private legal rights are dependent 
upon such cause; and (5) the need of society for bodies, tissues and organs for medical 
education, research, therapy and transplantation.  
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
39
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 6(b) (1987), 8A U.L.A. 54 (2003).  
 
40
 Id. § 10(a), 8A U.L.A. 62 (2003).  
 
41
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968), 8 U.L.A. 100 (1993); T.D. Overcast et al., 
Problems in the Identification of Potential Organ Donors, 251 J.A.M.A. 1559 (1984). According to 
a 1983 survey, only four states fully rely on the authority of donor documents as a basis for organ 
removal without familial consent. Id. at 1561-62. UAGA § 2 (e)-(g) protect the validity of organ 
donations by will from the effects of probate and testamentary invalidities. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT 
ACT § 2 (e)-(g) (1987), 8A U.L.A. 24 (2003). The common law and statue of wills generally 
supports this view. See Snyder v. Holy Cross Hosp., 352 A.2d 334, 341 n.12 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1976) (A corpse “is not part of the assets of the estate (though its disposition may be affected by the 
provision of the will).”); In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 1978) (Utah “laws relating 
to wills and the descent of property were not intended to relate to the body of a deceased.” However, 
a testamentary disposition of the deceased’s body is “binding after his death, so long as that is done 
within the limits of reason and decency as related to the accepted customs of mankind.”); Hecht v. 
Super. Ct. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 288-91(1993) (girlfriend of the decedent could maintain an action to 
recover sperm preserved in a sperm in accordance with the wishes of the deceased and against the 
protest of the decedent’s family).  
 
42
 Despite legal authority to harvest organs where evidence of the deceased’s 
documented consent to make a donative gift of organs is on hand, hospitals and organ procurement 
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Although the UAGA was adopted in every state, the organ 
deficit continued to grow and both the NCCUSL and the federal 
government took action. In 1984, Congress passed federal legislation to 
supplement state regulations in the form of the National Organ 
Transplant Act (“NOTA”).43 NOTA responded to the emerging 
commercial market44 for inter vivos transplants not regulated by the 
UAGA by expressly making it “unlawful for any person to knowingly 
acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable 
consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects 
interstate commerce.”45 In addition, NOTA created a task force to deal 
with organ procurement and transplantation46 and established the Organ 
Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN), which maintains a 
centralized system for matching donors with those in need of organs. The 
OPTN also sets standards for organ procurement organizations 
(“OPOs”).47 OPOs, in conformity with the OPTN, coordinate the 
physical transportation of organs to recipients in need.48 
In 1987, after the adoption of the NOTA, the NCCUSL proposed 
a revised version of the UAGA.49 The revised UAGA placed an increased 
emphasis on the wishes of the deceased over the surviving family’s 
rights,50 calling for routine inquiry and requests for donations by hospital 
personnel from patients and their families.51 Although these measures 
were designed to increase the number of donors,52 to date only twenty-six 
states have adopted 1987 UAGA.53 Many states, instead of adopting the 
  
agencies are often hesitant to proceed without consent from family. See, e.g., Mark F. Anderson, The 
Future of Organ Transplantation: From Where Will New Donors Come, to Whom Will Their Organs 
Go?, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 249, 264 (1995); Developments in the Law: Medical Technology and the 
Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1619 (1990) (citing “unwarranted fears of legal liability, a legitimate 
concern that negative publicity might damage further organ procurement efforts, [and] a desire to 
respect the family’s wishes”) (citations omitted). Where too many individuals have the right to 
override donations, there is a strong danger of inefficient under-use of resources. See Michael Heller, 
The Tragedy of the Anti-Commons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 621, 624 (1998). 
 
43
 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274 (2006).  
 
44
 RONALD MUNSON, RAISING THE DEAD: ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 
108-09 (2002) (noting that in 1983 Dr. H. B. Jacobs established International Kidney Exchange Ltd., 
a for profit company in the business of procuring organ donors who were paid for their services).  
 
45
 42 U.S.C. § 274(e) (penalty for violation of the statute includes a fine of up to $50,000 
and up to 3 years in prison). 
 
46
 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274.  
 
47
 Id. 
 
48
  42 U.S.C. § 273; see also New York Organ Donor Network Website, available at 
http://www.donatelifeny.org/glossary/glossary3.html#opo. 
 
49
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987), 8A U.L.A. 17 (2003). 
 
50
 Id. § 2(h), 8A U.L.A. 25 (2003). 
 
51
 Id. § 5, 8A U.L.A. 44-45 (2003). 
 
52
 See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (amended 2007), available at 
http://anatomicalgiftact.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=1&tabid=63.  
 
53
 Id. 
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UAGA, passed varying local reforms that have led to incongruity among 
the states.54 
In 2006, the NCCUSL proposed an updated version of the 
UAGA.55 Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have adopted 
the 2006 UAGA,56 which includes provisions to strengthen the rights of 
the deceased as well as to expand the list of those who may consent to 
donation on behalf of the deceased.57 However, while the UAGA 
purports to increase donors’ rights, the remedies available under UAGA 
remain largely unchanged from the 1968 and 1987 versions.58 Most 
importantly, the UAGA grants broad good faith immunities for nearly 
everyone involved in the organ procurement process.59 Indeed, the 
NCCUSL commentary to the UAGA recognizes the weakness of 
statutory remedies provided by the UAGA, noting that remedies and 
sanctions for bad faith violations may be found in “other laws of the state 
and federal governments . . . including those under regulatory rules, 
licensing requirements, Unfair and Deceptive Practices acts, and the 
common law.”60 While the real world effects of the legal changes in the 
2006 UAGA have yet to be fully determined, the current reality of organ 
donation in the U.S. is that the demand is rapidly outpacing the supply, 
despite legislative attempts to remedy the problem.61 The common law 
and the statutory overlay both fail to provide meaningful remedies 
through which the rights of the donors and donees may be enforced. 
II. RIGHTS OR WRONG 
Returning to the aforementioned hypothetical and the question of 
what legal recourse might be available for Moore and Micheline, there 
are a number of alternatives available. Many of these potential claims 
turn directly, or indirectly, on whether claimants can articulate a 
legitimate entitlement to some form of property in the body of the 
deceased.62 Traditionally, plaintiffs have framed claims for 
misappropriated organs under common law tort theories such as 
conversion,63 breach of fiduciary duty, or some form of dignitary tort.64 In 
  
 
54
  Id. 
 
55
 Id. 
 
56
 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Revised Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act: Enactment Status (2006), http://anatomicalgiftact.org/DesktopDefault.aspx 
?tabindex=2&tabid=72 (maintaining a running tally of enactments of the 2006 UAGA). 
 
57
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 5 (1987), 8A U.L.A. 44-45 (2003). 
 
58
 Compare REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §§ 9, 14, with UNIF. ANATOMICAL 
GIFT ACT §§ 3, 4, 8A U.L.A. 33-39.  
 
59
 REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 18. 
 
60
 Id. 
 
61
 Id. 
 
62
 See Grad v. Kaasa, 314 S.E.2d 755, 758 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (stating the right to the 
claim of “wrongful autopsy” based in a quasi-property right vesting in the next of kin).  
 
63
 See infra Part II.A.1. 
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a handful of cases, plaintiffs have attempted to proceed under some 
lesser-explored theories, including an implied right of action under 
UAGA,65 contract,66 and, in certain cases, claims for the violation of 
Constitutional rights.67 In the end, as each of these avenues for recovery 
are applied to Moore and Micheline’s situation, the legal remedies 
available are clearly inadequate and cannot enforce the wishes of 
Connery or even provide compensation for damages they have sustained. 
A. Tort-like Conduct 
Moore has what appears to be a good argument for a valid claim 
of conversion,68 provided that the court is willing to accept the 
proposition that he obtained a property interest in Connery’s kidney.69 
Micheline, as Connery’s next of kin, also may have obtained some form 
of property interest in Connery’s kidney, which could establish a prima 
facie claim for conversion.70 In traditional post-mortem corporeal 
mutilation cases, putative family members have forgone conversion 
claims in favor of dignitary torts of emotional distress.71 However, such 
claims are more difficult to sustain in the case of wrongfully 
appropriated organs because intentionally wrongful or negligent conduct 
may be difficult to prove.72 The burden of proving that the wrongful 
conduct was intentional or negligent is thus especially high in 
Micheline’s case, where consent to remove the organs was given, despite 
the fact that her wishes were not expressly followed.73 Given the obvious 
difficulties of sustaining an action for breach of fiduciary duty in this and 
  
 
64
 This Note currently does not address in detail claims for fraud or breach of fiduciary 
duties. While these tort theories may be tangentially relevant, they do not turn on issues of property 
interests in the body and are less relevant to the discussion in this Note and to Roger and Micheline’s 
situation. The major barriers to these claims lie in the required showing of intentionally wrongful or 
negligent conduct. See infra note 72. Indeed, Mrs. Colavito’s failure to show intentional 
misstatements by the NYODN in Colavito II led the second circuit to affirm the district courts’ 
dismissal of Mr. Colavito’s claim for fraud. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc. (Colavito 
II), 438 F.3d 214, 222 (2d Cir. 2006), certifying questions to 860 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 2006).  
 
65
 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 
66
 See infra Part II.B. 
 
67
 See infra Part II.C. 
 
68
 Mr. Colavito’s primary claim was an action for conversion. Colavio II, 438 F.3d at 223. 
 
69
 See infra Part II.A.1. 
 
70
 See infra Part II.A.1. 
 
71
 See Christensen v. Super. Ct., 820 P.2d 181, 183 (Cal. 1991) (negligence action 
sustained against defendants’ mishandling of a corpse). But see Wint v. Ala. Eye & Tissue Bank, 
675 So. 2d 383, 283 (Ala. 1996). 
 
72
 To establish a claim for fraud, plaintiffs must show (1) a material misrepresentation, 
(2) that defendants are aware of its falsity, (3) that the plaintiff relied upon the statement, and (4) that 
harm was suffered by plaintiff as a result of such reliance. Colavito II, 438 F.3d at 222. Colavito’s 
claim for fraud was dismissed by the court due to lack of proof. Id. Claims for breach of fiduciary 
duty, even assuming such a duty exists, while perhaps not establishing as onerous a burden as fraud 
in many cases, are still grounded in negligence and require more proof than actions for conversion.  
 
73
 Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc. (Colavito I), 356 F. Supp. 2d 237, 238 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 486 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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other similar cases, the subsequent analysis will focus on Micheline and 
Moore’s respective claims for conversion under the common law,74 as 
well as the complications arising from the application of the UAGA.75 
1. Micheline and Moore’s Conversion Claim 
To establish an action for conversion, the defendant must 
“intentional[ly] exercise . . . dominion or control over a chattel.”76 The 
primary barrier preventing Moore from maintaining a conversion claim 
is establishing a cognizable property interest in Connery’s organs.77 
Consistent with the common law tradition,78 courts have generally 
refused to recognize property in the body.79 Wint v. Alabama Eye & 
Tissue Bank is a notable exception, wherein the court recognized a 
widow’s claim for the conversion of her deceased husband’s corneas, 
removed post-mortem by a tissue bank, although ultimately the court 
ultimately dismissed the claim because the evidence was insufficient.80 
While this case may provide support for Micheline’s conversion claim, 
insofar as it relies on “quasi-property rights” vested in the next of kin, it 
offers Moore little consolation. Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals, 
in response to a certified question from the Second Circuit,81 disposed of 
  
 
74
 See infra Part II.A.1. 
 
75
 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 
76
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(1) (1965).  
 
77
 An action for conversion, unlike most torts, has no requirement of culpability. 
GOLDBERG, ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 777 (2004). Conversion thus avoids 
the burden of proof problems posed by a breach of fiduciary duty and many other intentional and 
negligent tort actions. Id. Importantly, reasonable mistake is not a defense under the common law 
and defendant’s mistaken belief of entitlement is irrelevant. See Ranson v. Kitner, 31 Ill. App. 241, 
241 (1888) (defendant’s reasonable mistake that he had lawfully killed a wild animal was not a 
defense).  
 
78
 See supra Part I.A. 
 
79
 Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc. (Colavito III), 860 N.E.2d 713, 719-22 
(N.Y. 2006); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488-89 (Cal. 1990); Hasselbach 
v. Mt. Sinai Hosp. 159 N.Y.S. 376, 379 (App. Div. 1916). But see Cornelio v. Stamford Hosp. 717 
A.2d 140, 143-44 (Conn. 1998) (assuming, but not deciding, property rights existed in a pap smear.) 
While this Note generally avoids the more fundamental and complicated question of what is a 
property interest, if one takes the “bundle of rights” approach to property law seriously, then any 
right may be considered property. Moore, 793 P.2d at 509-10 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see also infra 
notes 95, 182, and Part II.C.2 (discussing “new property” under the Due Process clause versus 
traditional property protected by the Takings Clause); see also infra note 90 (discussing types and 
characteristics of certain forms of property). 
 
80
 675 So. 2d 383 (Ala. 1996). 
 
81
 In Colavito II, the Second Circuit certified to the New York Court of Appeals the 
following questions: 
(1) Do the applicable provisions of the New York Public Health Law vest the intended 
recipient of a directed organ donation with rights that can be vindicated in a private 
party’s lawsuit sounding in the common law tort of conversion or through a private right 
of action inferred from the New York Public Health Law? (2) Does New York Public 
Health Law immunize either negligent or grossly negligent misconduct? (3) If a donee 
can bring a private action to enforce rights referred to in question 1, may the plaintiff 
recover nominal or punitive damages without demonstrating pecuniary loss or other 
actual injury? 
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the issue of conversion in the Colavito case, with facts substantially 
similar to Moore’s situation with the exception of compatibility, wholly 
on grounds of incompatibility.82 In Colavito, the decedent’s kidney was 
medically incompatible with the donee, who brought the conversion 
action against the NYODN, and since Colavito could not “use” the 
organ, no property interest vested in Colavito.83  
While Moore may lack the common law support of a legally 
fictitious, quasi-property interest, an argument may be made that any 
interest Micheline held was legally devised to Moore under the UAGA,84 
a statutory scheme which adds multiple layers of complication to the 
analysis.85 While the UAGA is generally restrictive with respect to 
possessory interests in organs,86 the UAGA does, although in very 
general terms, grant rights to donees as well as next of kin.87 The UAGA 
also establishes a hierarchy of rights among family members with the 
decedent’s spouse at the top of the list.88 This “right” is not expressly 
defined as a property interest, but rather as an authorization for a person 
who, absent a known objection by the decedent, “may make a gift” of the 
  
Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc. (Colavito II), 438 F.3d 214, 233 (2d Cir. 2006), 
certifying questions to 860 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 2006). Upon answering question (1) in the negative, 
the court declined to answer questions (2) and (3). Colavito III, 860 N.E.2d at 722. The issue of 
immunizing negligent conduct, mentioned in Question (2), is analyzed infra Part II.A.2.b and 
Question (3) is analyzed infra Part II.A.3.  
 
82
 See Colavito III, 860 N.E.2d at 719 (“[P]laintiff, as a specified donee of an 
incompatible kidney, has no common-law right to the organ.”). 
 
83
 See id. 
 
84
 See supra Part I.B. 
 
85
 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 
86
 See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10 (1987), 8A U.L.A. 62 (2003) (prohibiting sale 
of organs). 
 
87
 See id.§§ 8(a), 3(a) , 8A U.L.A. 33-34, 57-58. 
 
88
 UAGA § 3(a) states: 
Any member of the following classes of persons, in the order of priority listed, may make 
an anatomical gift of all or a part of the decedent’s body for an authorized purpose . . . : 
1. the spouse of the decedent; 
2. an adult son or daughter of the decedent; 
3. either parent of the decedent; 
4. an adult brother or sister of the decedent; 
5. a grandparent of the decedent; and 
6. a guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of death. 
Id.§ 3(a), 8A U.L.A. 33-34. 
  The 2006 UAGA proposes an expansion of the list to include persons acting as agents 
at the deceased’s death, adult grandchildren, and even close friends. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL 
GIFT ACT § 9 (amended 2007), available at http://anatomicalgiftact.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex= 
1&tabid=63. 
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decedent’s organs.89 Whether such a right rises to the level of property is 
subject to debate.90 
Moore’s case for property rights created under the UAGA lies 
with rights granted to the donee.91 The UAGA expressly states that the 
“[r]ights of a donee created by an anatomical gift are superior to the 
rights of others.”92 Whether a donation under the UAGA would create a 
property interest sufficient to sustain a claim for conversion remains an 
open question.93 Additionally, even assuming that Moore or Micheline 
can stake a legal claim to property rights in Connery’s organs for 
purposes of establishing a conversion claim, the UAGA further 
complicates recovery by granting good faith immunities to nearly 
everyone involved in the organ procurement process.94 Notwithstanding 
these immunities, a major advantage of a conversion claim over dignitary 
torts of negligence is that conversion is considered a strict liability tort, 
with no defense for good faith mistake.95 The UAGA’s good faith 
immunities thus negate this advantage by forcing plaintiffs to show 
intentional wrongdoing or bad faith in order for their claims to proceed, a 
difficult proposition for plaintiffs like Moore and Micheline.96 
  
 
89
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8(a), 8A U.L.A. 57-58. 
 
90
 The Supreme Court in at least one case found that government regulation that 
extinguished the limited right to devise property upon death constituted a taking of property under 
the Constitution. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717-18 (1987). Justice Mosk’s dissent in Moore 
refutes the holding of the majority, which states that “the statute eliminates so many of the rights 
ordinarily attached to property that one cannot simply assume that what is left amounts to ‘property’ 
or ‘ownership’ for purposes of conversion law.” Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 
479, 492 (Cal. 1990). Mosk argues that under the “bundle of rights” conception of property, it is well 
recognized that “some types of personal property may be sold but not given away, while others may 
be given away but not sold, and still others may neither be given away nor sold.” Id. at 510 
(footnotes omitted). Organs may properly be conceptualized as a “market inalienable” form of 
property, one that can be given away but not sold. DUKEMINIER, supra note 25, at 81 n.41. For a 
detailed discussion of alienability of property, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the 
Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985). 
 
91
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8(a), 8A U.L.A. 57-58. 
 
92
 Id.  
 
93
 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Colavito II analyzed the UAGA language as 
enacted by the state legislature of New York in N.Y. Public Health Law § 4301(5). Colavito v. N.Y. 
Organ Donor Network, Inc. (Colavito II), 438 F.3d 214, 225-26 (2d Cir. 2006), certifying questions 
to 860 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 2006). The court analyzed the language referring to the “rights of the 
donee” as an issue of an implied right of action and did not address the issue directly of whether 
such language implies a property right sufficient to sustain an action for conversion. Id. at 230-31; 
see infra Part II.A.2.a (fully discussing the second circuit’s treatment of Colavito’s claim for an 
implied right of action). 
 
94
 UAGA § 11(c) provides: 
A hospital, physician, surgeon, [coroner], [medical examiner], [local public health 
officer], enucleator, technician, or other person, who acts in accordance with this [Act] or 
with the applicable anatomical gift law of another state [or a foreign country] or attempts 
in good faith to do so is not liable for that act in a civil action or criminal proceeding. 
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 11(c), 8A U.L.A. 64. 
 
95
 See supra note 77. Reasonable mistake is not a defense under the common law and 
defendant’s mistaken belief of entitlement is irrelevant. Ranson v. Kitner, 31 Ill. App. 241 (App. Ct. 
1888). 
 
96
 For a full discussion of the immunity issue under the UAGA, see infra Part II.A.2.a. 
556 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:2  
 
2.  The Legislature Giveth, and It Taketh Away 
a. Implied Right of Action Under the UAGA 
Given the difficulties for Micheline and Moore in maintaining a 
cause of action for conversion due to the lack of property protections for 
post-mortem organ gifts under the common law, a more effective route 
for plaintiffs may be to pursue a statutory cause of action,97 which does 
not necessarily rely on legal property in the body.98 However, the UAGA 
and NOTA do not expressly provide for any civil remedies.99 In fact, the 
only remedies mentioned within either statute refer to statutory penalties 
for the sale or purchase of body parts.100 The federal standard for implied 
rights of action is very strict, essentially requiring an express right of 
action in the statute itself,101 thus foreclosing the possibility of an implied 
right of action under NOTA.102 In contrast, state law with respect to 
implied rights of action, while varying from state to state, is generally 
more liberal than the federal standard.103 For example, implied rights of 
action under New York law turn on: “(1) whether the plaintiff is one of 
the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether 
recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative 
purpose; and (3) whether creation of such a right would be consistent 
with the legislative scheme.”104 
Moore’s claim to an implied right of action under state law is 
based on the proposition that under the UAGA, the “[r]ights of a donee 
  
 
97
 While due process claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are technically brought 
under a statute and may be considered a statutory cause of action for some purposes, such claims are 
constitutional in nature and are analyzed in this Note together with claims brought under the Takings 
Clause. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 
98
 See also infra Part II.B (discussing contract claims which similarly do not depend on a 
violation of a property right). 
 
99
 See generally UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 17; 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274 
(1988). 
 
100
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10, 8A U.L.A. 62. But see REVISED UNIF. 
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (amended 2007), Summary of Changes in the Revised Act, available at 
http://anatomicalgiftact.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=1&tabid=63 (“[O]ther laws of the state 
and federal governments may provide for further including those under regulatory rules, licensing 
requirements, Unfair and Deceptive Practices acts, and the common law.”). 
 
101
 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-88 (2001); Touche Ross & Co. v. 
Reddington, 422 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (“The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not 
one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted 
into law.”). 
 
102
 In Colavito II, the second circuit stated that, under federal law standards for implied 
rights of action, “we would likely conclude that they do not imply a private right of action.” Colavito 
v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc. (Colavito II), 438 F.3d 214, 230 (2d Cir. 2006), certifying 
questions to 860 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 2006). Were such an action possible however, NOTA could have 
the effect of abrogating certain state law immunities. See infra Part II.A.2.b, note 174. 
 
103
 See Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P.3d 128, 133 (Mont. 2002) (surveying state court 
decisions, noting that about half have recognized implied rights of action in their respective state 
constitutions). 
 
104
 Colavito II, 438 F.3d at 214, 231. 
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created by an anatomical gift are superior to the rights of others.”105 
Moore’s argument also likely ends here106 because the UAGA’s only 
mention of “civil suits” refers to good faith immunities for defendants in 
civil suits for actions taken pursuant to the UAGA.107 While that may 
leave open the possibility of civil liability for bad faith violations, as 
discussed previously, such violations do not appear to be present in 
Moore’s case.108 Even assuming Moore could make a showing of bad 
faith, in the comments to the 2006 UAGA, the NCCUSL states that 
“remedies and sanctions” come from “other laws” rather than the 
UAGA,109 suggesting that a cause of action under the statute would be 
inconsistent with the legislative scheme. Perhaps the strongest argument 
against Moore’s individual claim comes from the prefatory note to the 
UAGA, which identifies the purposes of the UAGA and makes no 
reference to the protection of donees such as Moore, but rather to the 
“need of society for . . . organs for . . . transplantation.”110 Taken together, 
these provisions strongly suggest that the protection of individual rights 
was not contemplated by the enacting legislature. 
Micheline’s claim for recovery under an implied right of action 
faces similar obstacles as those facing Moore. Micheline, however, may 
rely on the prefatory statement to the UAGA which expressly states that 
two of its principal interests are “(1) the wishes of the deceased during 
his lifetime concerning the disposition of his body [and] (2) the desires of 
the surviving spouse or next of kin.”111 While the UAGA’s interests 
would arguably be furthered by providing a cause of action on behalf of 
Micheline, her entitlement to rights under the statute are not expressly 
“superior to the rights of others”112 and are not possessory. Instead, her 
rights are statutorily limited to the right of giving a gift of the decedent’s 
body parts.113 Providing a cause of action to protect such limited rights 
makes Micheline’s argument to qualify as a member of the protected 
class a difficult one. Like Moore, Micheline is unlikely to succeed, as a 
  
 
105
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8(a), 8A U.L.A. 57-58.  
 
106
 But see Daniel Jardine, Liability Issues Arising out of Hospitals’ and Organ 
Procurement Organizations’ Rejection of Valid Anatomical Gifts: The Truth and Consequences, 
1990 WIS. L. REV. 1655 (1990). Jardine proposes an interesting alternative theory of liability under 
the UAGA, arguing that rejection of valid donations by decedents in favor of consent from next of 
kin by health care officials and organ procurement organizations is in contravention of the UAGA 
and creates liability for such organizations. Id. at 1659. The cause of action vests in the potential 
donee and could take a number of forms, including an action in negligence, tortuous interference, or 
invasion of privacy. Id. at 1659-60. 
 
107
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 11(c), 8A U.L.A. 64. 
 
108
 See infra Part II.A.2.b.  
 
109
 See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (amended 2007), available at 
http://anatomicalgiftact.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=1&tabid=63. 
 
110
 Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc. (Colavito III), 860 N.E.2d 713, 720 
(N.Y. 2006) (emphasis added) (citing UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968), 8 U.L.A. 100 (1993)).  
 
111
 Id. 
 
112
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8(a), 8A U.L.A. 57-58 (referring to rights of a donee). 
 
113
 Id. § 3(a), 8A U.L.A. 33-34. 
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cause of action for either is inconsistent with and does not promote the 
legislative purpose.114  
b.  Impaired Right of Action Under the UAGA 
Even if Moore and Micheline overcame the substantial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case, the UAGA still complicates matters by 
extending significant immunities to anyone remotely involved in the 
organ donation process as long as their actions are taken in “good 
faith.”115 The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Williams v. Hoffman,116 
defining the scope of immunities under the UAGA, held that such 
immunities extend to “(a) the mechanics of giving and receiving 
anatomical gifts, (b) the determination of the time of death, and (c) 
procedures following death.”117 The court also stated that such 
immunities are a valid “limitation on liability . . . justified by the 
legitimate public purpose of encouraging doctors to participate in the 
removal of organs following death, and therefore increase their 
supply.”118 
Similarly in Nicoletta v. Eye & Human Parts Bank Inc., a New 
York court found no liability for defendants who, in good faith, accepted 
a donation that was later discovered to be invalid under the UAGA.119 
Thus, the only limit to the liability for those acting within the scope of 
  
 
114
 See Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc. (Colavito II), 438 F.3d 214, 231 (2d 
Cir. 2006), certifying questions to 860 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 2006). 
 
115
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 11(c), 8A U.L.A. 64. 
 
116
 223 N.W.2d 844 (Wis. 1974). In Williams, a plaintiff widower sought damages for 
wrongful removal of his deceased wife’s kidneys as well as an action for abuses while she was still 
alive against her doctor and the hospital. Id. at 845-46. The court found that an affirmative defense 
of immunity under the UAGA was applicable where the doctor and the hospital had relied “in good 
faith” on a signed consent form. Id. However, the immunity did not apply to wrongful conduct 
against the wife prior to the allegedly wrongful removal of organs. Id. at 847. 
 
117
 Id. at 846. 
 
118
 Id. at 848-49. Of course, even assuming that these immunities have real world effects 
on behavior, it is debatable whether the benefits of such a regime outweigh the costs. Indeed, the 
legislature’s incentives appear to be misguided. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: 
OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? (1997) (arguing against government intervention in 
health care generally in favor of private ordering). As stated previously, the purpose of the 
immunities is to increase participation by health care organizations in the organ donation process. 
However, the problem is not health care participation but donor participation. Id. at 249-61 
(discussing the supply side of organ donation). Shifting incentives to encourage donor participation 
would seem the more prudent course. See Colavito II, 438 F.3d at 229 (“[G]eneralized goals of 
increasing organ donations could plausibly be furthered either by shielding organ procurement 
organizations from liability or by giving donors and donees enforceable rights to remedy and deter 
misconduct.”); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 194.270(3) (1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.517(5) (West 
2002) (both statutes immunizing only “non-negligent” good faith conduct, presumably to protect 
donees rights rather than those involved in the organ procurement business). 
 
119
 519 N.Y.S.2d 928, 929 (Sup. Ct. 1987). In Nicoletta, decedent’s organs were donated 
pursuant to UAGA § 3(a) by a woman who had lived with the decedent for 10 years and claimed to 
be his wife. Id. at 930. Subsequently it was discovered that the woman had no legal relation to the 
decedent and that the donation was invalid under the UAGA. Id. 
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the UAGA is that they act in “good faith,”120 generally understood as not 
acting with fraud, malice, or dishonesty.121 In Moore and Micheline’s 
cases, showing fraud, malice, or dishonesty imposes a difficult burden.122 
However, if Dr. No had stolen the other kidney or the NYODN sold it on 
the black market, certainly there would be a variety of valid claims 
available.123 
In recognizing the limits of these claims, it is important to 
remember that the UAGA has not been adopted uniformly among the 
states, and that there are substantial differences—even conflicts—in laws 
governing health and organ procurement practices within and between 
the states.124 Some states have even expressly amended the UAGA to 
immunize only those who act “in good faith and without negligence.”125 
While the effects of the good faith immunity vary greatly from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and the dearth of caselaw provides few 
concrete examples, in the end, these immunities undoubtedly work to 
diminish or extinguish Moore and Micheline’s respective interests in 
Connery’s organs.126 
  
 
120
 But see Jardine, supra note 106, at 1659-60. Jardine argues that action taken in 
contravention of the purpose of the UAGA to “facilitat[e] the need for human organs” would not 
create entitlement to any immunities under the act. Id. at 1664. Jardine applies the argument to 
liability arising out of the rejection of valid organ donations. Id. at 1659-60. In Rogers and 
Micheline’s case, it may be argued that damaging a kidney cannot be seen as an action “facilitating 
the need for human organs,” and thus the immunities should not apply. It is doubtful that an already 
strained argument would stretch so far, and indeed, such an interpretation taken to its extreme would 
essentially do away with any meaningful protection provided by the UAGA immunities, which may 
be desirable policy but contravenes legislative intent. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 11(c), 8A 
U.L.A. 64. 
 
121
 See Nicoletta, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 930 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)). 
 
122
 In Colavito II, on substantially similar facts, the court dismissed allegations of fraud. 
Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc. (Colavito II), 438 F.3d 214, 216, 222 (2d Cir. 2006), 
certifying questions to 860 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 2006). 
 
123
 See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (amended 2007), Summary of Changes in 
the Revised Act, available at http://anatomicalgiftact.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=1&tabid=63 
(suggesting remedies under the “common law”).  
 
124
 For example, New York does include the “good faith” immunity under UAGA, but 
under N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4351(7) (McKinney 2007), “any person or organization acting 
pursuant to [the UAGA] shall be legally responsible for any negligent or intentional act or omission 
committed by such entity or its employees or agents.” Id. The second circuit certified a question on 
this issue to the New York Court of Appeals, which the court of appeals did not reach, disposing of 
the case wholly on a factual finding of incompatibility. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc. 
(Colavito III), 860 N.E.2d 713, 722 (N.Y. 2006). The discrepancies between state regulations raise 
interesting issues of conflict of laws for transfers between states, as well as the extent to which such 
regulation may impermissibly affect interstate commerce. 
 
125
 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.517(5) (West 2002) (emphasis added).  
 
126
 Also note that permitting actions for negligence certainly does not negate immunities 
for good faith, especially for causes of action explored in this Note which do not generally rely on 
negligence. See generally Part II. Concepts of good faith and negligence operate independently. See, 
e.g., Berrios v. Our Lady of Mercy Med. Ctr., 799 N.Y.S.2d 452, 454 (App. Div. 2005) (“Although 
defendants . . . could be found to be negligent . . . all evidence points to the conclusion that 
defendants were acting in good faith.”); People v. Lunney, 378 N.Y.S.2d 559, 563-64 (Sup. Ct. 
1975) (grand jury minutes lost by a prosecutor considered “a ‘good faith’ negligent loss”); see also 
notes 124-125 (statutes waiving immunity for good faith negligence). 
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3.  Kidneys for Cash? Tort-like Damages and Valuation127 
In the unlikely event that Moore and Micheline were to 
successfully assert a prima facie case and somehow overcome the 
UAGA’s statutory immunities, collecting meaningful damages on such a 
claim adds yet another layer of complication. Micheline and Moore’s 
respective predicaments relating to damages are very different. Their 
situations are distinguished by the nature of the harm suffered by 
Micheline as next of kin and that suffered by Moore as a plaintiff in dire 
need of a kidney transplant. 
Traditionally, damages available to next of kin in cases of 
corporeal mutilation provided compensation for “mental suffering and 
anguish . . . from the realization that disrespect and indignities have been 
heaped upon the body of one who was close to him in life.”128 This 
compensable quantum of mental suffering sustained by Micheline could 
be determined by a jury based on evidence presented at trial.129 However, 
as is evident in Moore and Micheline’s case, where wrongful 
appropriation of organs is at issue, any showing of mental pain and 
suffering is likely to be nominal.130 Nevertheless, in extreme cases of 
reckless corporeal mutilation or cases of intentional theft of body parts, 
punitive damages would certainly be appropriate.131 
Moore on the other hand, is asserting “a practical use for the 
organ, not a sentimental one,”132 and as such, Moore has a much stronger 
argument for meaningful recovery. Moore may claim entitlement to a 
market price remedy,133 although several courts have refused to entertain 
the concept of valuating organs as it is against public policy.134 But the 
  
 
127
 The discussion of damages, while focused on tort damages, also has significant 
bearing on damages for breach of contract and constitutional claims. See infra Part II.B-C. Unique 
damages issues raised in those contexts will be addressed separately. See infra Part II.B-C. 
 
128
 Harry R. Bigelow, Jr., Note, Damages: Pleading: Property: Who May Recover for 
Wrongful Disturbance of a Dead Body, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 108, 110 (1933). 
 
129
 See Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 89 (Mo. 1985) (discussing both 
mental and physical suffering as elements of damages properly presented to the jury). 
 
130
 See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the difficulty of establishing negligence in a tort 
action as a primary advantage of actions for conversion).  
 
131
 Punitive damages are available to plaintiffs wronged by negligence where defendant’s 
conduct demonstrates “reckless indifference to the rights of others.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 908(2) (1979). Nominal damages could provide appropriate relief where such damages 
could support an award for punitives. See Jacque v. Steenburg Homes Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 157, 
161 (Wis. 1997) (upholding an award for $1 in nominal damages and $100K in punitives). But see 
Action House Inc. v. Koolik, 54 F.3d 1009, 1013-15 (2d Cir. 1995) (vacating an entirely punitive 
judgment). The Supreme Court has also held that excessive punitives out of balance with 
compensatory damages may implicate the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580-83 (1996); Phillip Morris v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 
(2007); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker 128 S. Ct. 2605. 
 
132
 Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc. (Colavito II), 438 F.3d 214, 225 (2d Cir. 
2006), certifying questions to 860 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 2006). 
 
133
 See id. at 221 n.9 (noting that Colavito submitted substantial evidence, in the form of a 
CNN article reporting an e-bay auction, of the value of a kidney). 
 
134
 Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc. (Colavito I), 356 F. Supp. 2d 237, 244 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 486 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2007); Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr. Inc., 527 S.E.2d 
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courts need not restrict themselves to a market price remedy, as other 
options may be available.135 Similar to the pain and suffering associated 
with the loss suffered by the next of kin in wrongful donation cases, 
Moore may be compensated for the loss of his enjoyment of a kidney.136 
Such a remedy might include the future health care costs associated with 
dialysis or other treatments incident to the loss of the limb.137 Indeed, the 
courts’ fears of violating public policy seem somewhat unjustified where 
juries and even government agencies, under programs such as the 
worker’s compensation fund, regularly determine the value of human life 
and body parts with striking specificity.138 Despite these potential 
remedies, Moore will likely find it difficult to collect adequate 
damages139 due to a lack of precedent and the novel nature of his claim to 
damages.140 The complete lack of recovery further underscores the 
futility of pursuing a tort law remedy. 
B. Broken Hearts and Contracts 
An analysis of Moore and Micheline’s rights and remedies under 
contract law brings into focus a variety of problems, somewhat unique to 
organ donation law, that have attracted surprisingly little attention from 
  
240, 244 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). The courts’ notion of public policy in these cases seems somewhat 
unjustified in light of State Worker’s Compensation Statute, which provides values for compensation 
for the loss of limbs and other body parts. See. e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-121(3) (2007) (setting 
forth compensation as a percentage of wages for a thumb, finger, hand, and nose). Indeed, valuating 
organs is in many ways a much easier proposition than that of valuing pain and suffering associated 
with emotional distress or loss of future profits, and yet courts are more comfortable engaging in 
such less gruesome, highly speculative analysis. See GOLDBERG, ET AL., TORT LAW: 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 461 n.1 (2004). 
 
135
 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. S. Pac. Co., 268 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1925) (“Where 
there is no market value . . . [the value is measured by] the sum that in all probability would result 
from fair negotiations between an owner willing to sell and a purchaser desiring to buy.”); Rhoades, 
Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 341, 344 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (“Where there is the 
destruction of personal property without a market value . . . damages . . . [are] based upon its special 
value to the plaintiff.”); Szekely v. Eagle Lion Films, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 843, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) 
(“Even if there were no other market . . . plaintiff . . . is entitled to damages ‘based upon its special 
value to him.’”) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 927(c)). 
 
136
 Colavito II, 438 F.3d at 225 (noting that Colavito is suing in reality for the “loss of a 
functioning organ”). 
 
137
 Id. 
 
138
 See supra note 134 (identifying statutory value placed on body parts).  
 
139
 In Colavito II, the Second Circuit proceeded under the assumption that the amount in 
controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction could be satisfied by nominal damages with the 
possibility of punitives. 438 F.3d at 221-22; see supra note 131 (discussing potential for punitive 
damages). 
 
140
 Obviously, common forms of equitable relief available to plaintiffs asserting 
conversion claims would be unavailable to Roger. See infra note 165 (discussing unavailability of 
specific performance under contract theory). Specifically, the idea of replevin in the context of organ 
donation would not be taken seriously as removing transplanted kidneys would raise serious ethical 
concerns. Further, injunctive relief against the organ donor network, in the form of providing him 
with another kidney, may also be precluded on policy grounds because such an action would 
presumably deprive another donor on a waiting list of an organ. See Colavito II, 438 F.3d at 223 
n.11. 
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courts and commentators.141 Micheline signed a document authorizing a 
donation of her husband’s kidneys to Moore, thereby presumably 
creating some sort of legal relationship between her, the health care 
service provider, and Moore.142 Recovery under contract is not burdened 
by muddled doctrines of property rights in the body, but turns instead on 
whether the legal relationship that has been created constitutes a contract 
or something else.143 Whether such a relationship or contract can be 
legally enforced is of central importance to the integrity of the organ 
donation system, established in part by the UAGA.144 
1.  A Problem that Merits “Consideration” 
The black letter law of contract formation requires an offer, an 
acceptance, and some form of consideration.145 Consideration is usually 
something of value offered in exchange for the promise to perform an 
obligation.146 The UAGA expressly prevents someone from giving 
“valuable consideration” in exchange for organs.147 Of course, the 
unavailability of valuable consideration does not act as an absolute bar to 
the formation of a contract. It is well established that a “contract” may be 
enforced without consideration, specifically when reliance by a party 
triggers promissory estoppel.148 However, an argument can be made that 
the UAGA’s bar against “valuable consideration” is intended to imply a 
bar against any enforceable contract. Indeed, the act is entitled the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, and provides procedures by which donors 
  
 
141
 Nevertheless, the idea of contracting for body parts is at least as old as Shakespeare. 
See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1. In Shakespeare’s play the 
antagonist, Shylock, guarantees a debt with a contract containing a provision that in the event of 
default on the loan, he shall be entitled to a “pound of flesh” from the debtor. Id. 
 
142
 Colavito II, 438 F.3d at 217-18. 
 
143
 See infra Part II.B.1. 
 
144
 See infra Part III.A.  
 
145
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 22, 71 (1979). 
 
146
 Id. § 71 (consideration may be given through “(a) an act other than a promise, or (b) a 
forbearance, or (c) the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation”). 
 
147
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10(a) (1987), 8A U.L.A. 62 (2003). It is important to 
note that the UAGA only defines “valuable consideration” insofar as it excludes “reasonable 
payment for the removal, processing, disposal, preservation, quality control, storage, transportation, 
or implantation of a part,” thereby allowing state courts and legislatures to interpret the limits of 
valuable consideration. Id. § 10(b), 8A U.L.A. 62. Indeed, there is present and proposed legislation 
that seems to test the limits of “valuable consideration.” See Sarah Elizabeth Statz, Note, Finding the 
Winning Combination: How Blending Organ Procurement Systems Used Internationally Can 
Reduce the Organ Shortage, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1677, 1700-03 (identifying a number of 
legislative attempts to incentivize donation, including: tax credits, discounted fees for driver’s 
licenses, and funeral expenses). South Carolina has also explored the possibility of letting prisoners 
out early in exchange for organs. CBS News, Wanna Cut Your Jail Time? Donate A Kidney! S.C. 
Legislation Would Reduce Prison Terms For Inmates Who Donate Organs, Bone Marrow, Mar. 8, 
2007,http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/08/national/main2548860.shtml. 
 
148
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979). Contracts may also be 
formed in certain instances through nominal consideration. U.C.C. §§ 2-205, 2-209 (2001). 
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may make an “anatomical gift.”149 One may reasonably infer that the 
UAGA provides the means and form to execute a legal gift-promise, 
which is revocable at will and conceptually distinct from a contract, 
which requires consideration and is binding.150 Yet, some courts have 
held that under the policies of the UAGA and NOTA, private parties 
have no authority to enter into a binding contract for disposition of 
organs, displacing common law promissory estoppel.151 
Not all cases take such a restrictive view. Specifically, the 
Second Circuit in Colavito explicitly recognized the possibility of the 
formation of a contract based on principles of reliance on identical facts 
to Moore’s case.152 Moore’s reliance on Micheline’s promise in going to 
the hospital and being fully prepped for surgery could be sufficient 
reliance to form a binding contract,153 although such reliance is not 
necessary where he is the beneficiary of the contract between Micheline 
and the NYODN.154 In such a case, Moore’s right to recovery depends 
upon the existence of the underlying contract between Micheline and the 
NYODN. Thus, although the Second Circuit’s decision in Colavito 
  
 
149
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 1, 8A U.L.A. 18. (defining “anatomical gift” as “a 
donation of all or part of a human body to take effect upon or after death”) (emphasis added). 
 
150
 See generally GRANT GILLMORE, THE DEATH OF A CONTRACT (1974) (arguing that 
consideration is a dead formality and that reliance has effectively displaced consideration as the sine 
qua non of contract law). Importantly, it is a legal certainty that promises to make inter vivos gifts 
are unenforceable and revocable at will. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(f), 8A U.L.A. 24 
(donations revocable at will by donor prior to death). Revocable agreements may merely by 
considered illusory or gift promises. However, the policy concerns against coercion are not relevant 
upon death, and indeed the UAGA states that “[a]n anatomical gift that is not revoked by the donor 
before death is irrevocable and does not require the consent or concurrence of any person after the 
donor’s death.” UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(h), 8A U.L.A.25. 
 
151
 Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (D. Kan. 1995) 
(“[A] contract approach to organ and tissue donation is not reconcilable with societal beliefs and 
values on this subject. UAGA embodies a commitment to the belief that organs should be given as a 
gift, either to a specific individual or to society at large.”) (footnotes omitted). Foreclosing formation 
through promissory estoppel makes some sense, especially where one considers the potential 
situation where Connery promises to make an inter vivos transfer of a kidney to Moore. It is 
unthinkable that any amount of reliance on the part of Moore, even if he were prepped for surgery 
and on the operating table, would prevent Connery from changing his mind and refusing to donate.  
 
152
 Colavito II, 438 F.3d at 228 n.14. 
 
153
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979) (“A promise which the 
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a 
third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided 
only by enforcement of the promise.”). 
 
154
 Colavito II, 438 F.3d at 228 n.14. The second circuit did not find the fact that 
Micheline was the party who entered into the original contract to be problematic for Moore seeking 
recovery on the contract, noting that  
New York follows the nearly universal rule that a third person may, in his own right and 
name, enforce a promise made for his benefit even though he is a stranger both to the 
contract and to the consideration. . . . [T]here is need for neither consideration from, nor 
privity with, nor obligation to, the third person.  
Colavito II, 438 F.3d at 228 n.14 (citation omitted). 
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indicates that it would accept the validity of the underlying contract, 
again, other courts may disagree with such an approach.155 
2.  “Special” Damages? 
Forming a contract does not help plaintiffs like Moore and 
Micheline unless the contract provides a legal means of meaningful 
recovery.156 For example, in Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr., a plaintiff 
widow brought an action for contract damages, among other claims, for 
removal of her deceased husband’s eye tissue without her consent.157 
Although the court held that selling eye tissue is illegal, and therefore 
contract recovery was not available for the value of the eye tissue,158 the 
court proceeded to apply a contract damages remedy.159 Specifically, the 
court found the proper remedy to be any extra cost paid to the mortuary 
due to the removal of the corpse’s corneas.160 These damages, while 
perhaps insignificant in Mrs. Bauer’s case, are in fact consequential 
damages on the contract.161 Consequential damages are foreseeable 
damages resulting indirectly from the breach of contract, such as extra 
expenses incurred as a result of the breach, lost revenues, and repair 
costs.162  
  
 
155
 Id. But see Perry, 886 F. Supp. at 1563 (“The consent form simply memorializes their 
consent to donate. It does not purport to set forth any particular rights and duties of the parties like a 
written contract would be expected to do. . . . The court rejects the plaintiffs’ attempts to construct an 
enforceable contract from these facts.”). 
 
156
 See LLEWELLYN, supra note 11. 
 
157
 527 S.E.2d 240, 242 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). 
 
158
 Courts often cite public policy as an excuse for not allowing contract remedies or for 
not enforcing contracts for the sale of organs. See Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc. 
(Colavito I), 356 F. Supp. 2d 237, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 486 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2007). However, 
if one takes the UAGA seriously, public policy does allow transactions for organs every day between 
families of the deceased and donation organizations or hospitals. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT 
§ 6, 8A U.L.A. 53-54. Whether these transactions are contracts or not is inconsequential in the vast 
majority of donations where no serious complications arise. However, the distinction becomes much 
more than mere semantics where a dispute arises and a legal enforcement is sought. Indeed, one 
would hope that compliance with a donor’s wishes would be more than voluntary. But see Epstein, 
supra note 118 at 258 (“No ongoing market could operate if the performance of each contract 
depended solely on its legal enforcement.”). 
 
159
 Bauer, 527 S.E.2d at 245 (denying damages for pain and suffering “[b]ecause Bauer’s 
claims for mental pain and suffering are not pecuniary damages, they cannot be recovered pursuant 
to her contract claims”); see also Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 644 (N.H. 1929) (denying 
recovery for pain and suffering). Potential inability of recovery for pain and suffering is another 
deterrent for plaintiffs seeking contract recovery, especially plaintiffs like Micheline who have 
suffered no pecuniary harm. 
 
160
 Bauer, 527 S.E.2d at 245 (“In this case, therefore, Bauer might recover damages 
relating to any extra cost paid to the mortuary which flows directly from the removal of Mr. Bauer’s 
eyes. Such damages might, for example, include any additional charge to prepare a corpse with its 
eyes removed for burial, or costs related to any delay in funeral proceedings resulting from such 
additional preparation, or other such limited damages.”). 
 
161
 Id.; see also Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854).  
 
162
 See Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151 (“Now we think the proper rule in such a case as the 
present is this: Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages 
which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may 
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Moore, in seeking recovery under a contract theory may be 
entitled to more than consequential damages.163 Despite cases like Bauer 
insisting otherwise, Colavito did rule out completely a market price 
remedy, or at least the value of a kidney to Moore.164 However, as most 
courts addressing the issue express discomfort with kidney valuation, 
squeamishness over specific performance is certainly even more acute, 
and pragmatic considerations simply rule out performance as a viable 
option.165 
In sum, potential contract claims may appear to have advantages 
over tort theories by circumventing many legal concerns of property in 
the body.166 Any advantage, however, is offset by problems of contract 
formation generally sufficient to prevent recovery, not to mention a host 
of concurrent problems shared by statutory167 and tort168 causes of action. 
Specifically, contract law does little to resolve issues of damages169 and 
immunities under the UAGA.170 On balance, advantages under theories of 
contract, while making for interesting discussion,171 provide no tangible 
  
fairly and reasonably be considered [] arising naturally . . .,from such breach of contract itself . . .”); 
Bauer, 527 S.E.2d at 245. 
 
163
 Colavito II, 438 F.3d 214, 225 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Plaintiffs such as Colavito . . . have . . . 
a practical use for the organ, not a sentimental one.”); see supra Part II.A.3 (discussing damages). 
 
164
 See supra Part II.A.1; Colavito II, 438 F.3d at 220, 225. 
 
165
 Courts generally disfavor specific performance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 367(1) & cmt. a (1981); Fitzpatrick v. Michael, 9 A.2d 639, 641 (Md. 1939). Courts 
would especially disfavor specific performance where such performance would come at the cost of 
others receiving organs.  
 
166
 For one thing, recovery under contract does not turn on whether a property interest has 
been formed in the organ but on the enforcement of rights granted pursuant to a statute. See UNIF. 
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987), 8A U.L.A. 17 (2003). Colavito II, 438 F.3d at 228 n.14 
(recognizing a contract). But see infra Part II.C.1 (discussing Due Process conception of property 
including statutory rights). 
 
167
 See supra Part II.A.2.a. 
 
168
 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 
169
 See supra Part II.A.3. Also, importantly, punitive damages are not collectible under an 
action for breach of contract. Timothy J. Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The 
Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207, 218-19 (1977). 
 
170
 Immunities under UAGA are especially prohibitive to claims in the area of contracts, 
given that breach of contract, unlike most torts (conversion being an exception), does not necessarily 
entail negligence. See supra Part II.A.1-2 (noting the evidentiary advantage of conversion over torts 
of negligence and the scope of immunities for purposes of conversion). State statutory schemes 
providing liability for negligent action in the organ donation process under UAGA will not provide a 
way around the good faith immunity problem absent a showing that the breach of contract was taken 
in “bad faith.” UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 5, 8A U.L.A. 44; see supra notes 124, 125. 
 
171
 A few cases have attempted to bring body parts within the U.C.C. as goods, primarily 
to invoke the implied warranty protections afforded by the U.C.C. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 
(1990); Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1182, 1254-55 n.487 (1974). While 
these attempts have been uniformly unsuccessful, several states have passed statutes which expressly 
state that blood, semen, and other body parts are “services” in order to avoid this problem. Id. at 
1254; Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Note, Personalizing Personality: Toward a Property Right in 
Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 224-25 (1991). However, if states are passing statutes which 
expressly categorize such body parts and fluids as services, that suggests that there is some support 
for the argument that organs should be classified as “goods,” thereby making the advantages of the 
U.C.C. available to donees. See GOLDBERG, ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITY AND REDRESS 825-26. 
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benefits to plaintiffs like Moore and Micheline over other theories of 
recovery. 
C. Is There a Constitutional Right to Your Corneas? 
While plaintiffs such as Moore and Micheline encounter 
significant difficulty due to the inadequacy of common law and statutory 
remedies, perhaps relief may be found through an appeal to a higher 
source. Specifically, the Constitution may provide relief either in the 
form of a property right under the Takings Clause172 or as a right 
protected under the Due Process Clause.173 Importantly, constitutional 
claims may be more likely to succeed, in that they are not subject to 
statutory immunities under the UAGA.174 Other significant obstacles 
remain as both takings and due process claims, similar to conversion 
claims,175 are based on the existence of a property right, although the 
precise contours of that property right under claims for conversion, 
takings, and due process violations all bear important differences from 
one another. 
In addition to the loss of a recognized property interest, it is 
essential for both Takings and Due Process purposes that the proprietary 
deprivation be effectuated by the government.176 The Constitution does 
not protect individuals from private actors, but rather from those acting 
“under color of [the law].”177 In our beginning hypothetical, neither Dr. 
No nor the NYODN178 are state actors. To simplify the constitutional 
analysis, now assume that Dr. No is a coroner, who is a state actor.179 
  
 
172
 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. “). 
 
173
 Id. (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.”). 
 
174
 Concerns of immunities under the UAGA may be eviscerated by Congress through 
action under statutes like NOTA, depending on complicated doctrines of federal abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996). In the vast majority of circumstances coroners acting pursuant to statute will be agents of a 
city or county which do not enjoy the full protection of state sovereign immunity. Lincoln County v. 
Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). Most importantly for purposes of takings and due process claims, 
where state actors engage in unconstitutional conduct, such action is not protected by state sovereign 
immunity, although available relief may be significantly restricted. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 
(1908). 
 
175
 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 
176
 MICHAEL WELLS & THOMAS EATON, CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES: A REFERENCE 
GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 29 (2002). 
 
177
 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
 
178
 NYODN operates as a nonprofit corporation although they are a “federally designated 
[OPO].” New York Organ Donor Network, http://www.donatelifeny.org/about/about_what.html (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2008). 
 
179
 State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986) (assuming the issue of state action but 
finding statute authorizing corneal tissue removal to be constitutional); Georgia Lions Eye Bank, 
Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985) (same); Grad v. Kaasa, 314 S.E.2d 755, 758 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1984) (noting that “a medical examiner is a public official”). The state action requirement may 
also be satisfied where a coroner authorizes a third party to take action to remove organs pursuant to 
presumed consent laws. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.60 (West 2008) (presumed consent 
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Assume also that Connery promised Moore two functioning corneas to 
replace Moore’s defective corneas. Assume further that Dr. No removed 
Connery’s corneas acting pursuant to a state “presumed consent” 
statute,180 without providing notice and while unaware of the decedent’s 
wishes. Presumed consent laws assume, under certain circumstances, that 
decedents have consented to the taking of body parts, regardless of the 
potential property interests which may have vested in the next of kin or 
in an intended donee.181 While it is unlikely that Micheline or Moore 
would be entitled to some form of constitutional relief, even if they were, 
the remedies available under the Due Process Clause and Takings Clause 
are clearly inadequate. 
1.  Due Process Claims 
In order for Moore or Micheline to bring a successful due 
process claim, they must show that they have suffered (1) a deprivation 
of (2) property (3) under color of state law.182 Assuming that the third 
element, state action, is satisfied by the actions of the coroner or his 
agent,183 the central problem with their claim turns again on the familiar 
dilemma of whether property exists, here specifically for purposes of the 
Due Process Clause.184 The determination of whether a property right 
exists for Due Process Clause purposes185 requires substantially similar 
  
statute including a provision for a “deputy coroner,” acting under direction of an official coroner to 
remove eyes or eye tissue); Lawyer v. Kernodle, 721 F.2d 632, 635 (8th Cir. 1983) (employee of 
company hired by coroner to conduct autopsy “was performing those duties under color of state 
law”). 
 
180
 State presumed consent laws generally allow for removal of corneas, eyes, or pituitary 
glands where no objection is known of by a coroner or medical examiner. See Jaffe, supra note 32, 
at 531 (surveying presumed consent laws, including: ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-320 (1987) (pituitary 
gland); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 27491.46-.47 (West 1988) (pituitary and corneas); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 30-10-621 (1986) (pituitary); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-281 (West 1986) (pituitary and 
corneas); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4712 (Supp. 1988) (corneas); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.9185 
(West 1989) (corneas); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-23-6 (1985) (eyes and corneas); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 311.187 (LexisNexis 1988) (corneas); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS CODE § 4-509.1 (West 
1989) (corneas); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.10202 (West 1989) (corneas); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
58.770 (West 1989) (pituitary); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-391 (1989) (corneas); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2108.60 (West 1987) (corneas); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 944.1 (West 1990) (pituitary); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-30-204 (West 1989) (corneas) (repealed); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
ANN. § 693.012 (Vernon 1990) (corneas); W. VA. CODE § 16-19-3a (1985) (corneas) (repealed)). 
 
181
 But see infra note 188. 
 
182
 Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 
183
 See supra note 179.  
 
184
 This inquiry under the Due Process Clause differs in some respects and is arguably 
less stringent than inquiries under the common law or the Takings Clause. See Jaffe, supra note 32, 
at 556-58 (discussing “new property,” such as statutory entitlements, protected by due process as 
opposed to more traditional common-law property, protected by both Due Process and Takings 
Clauses). 
 
185
 But see Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 481-82 (avoiding analysis of Ohio property law by 
noting that while “the existence of an interest may be a matter of state law, whether that interest rises 
to the level of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected by the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause is 
determined by federal law” (quoting Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978))). 
See Jaffe, supra note 184, at 556-58 (discussing “new property” entitled to due process protection). 
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analysis as the determination of whether a property might exist in an 
organ in state law actions for conversion.186 Expounding on due process 
property rights, the Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth stated 
that “[p]roperty interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. 
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing 
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as 
state law.”187 
The facts that must be shown to determine whether property 
rights in organs are sufficient to trigger Due Process protections vary by 
jurisdiction.188 The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have suggested that state-law 
rights to prevent mutilation or removal of organs can constitute a 
property interest under the Due Process Clause.189 In Brotherton v. 
Cleveland,190 the court found that a widow’s property interest in her 
deceased husband’s corneas, which had been removed pursuant to a state 
presumed consent statute,191 constituted a property interest entitled to due 
  
 
186
 See Parts I.A, II.A.1. 
 
187
 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Federal law can also create property rights. See Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (Federal social security disability benefits conferred by federal 
legislation is a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause.). See Jaffe, supra note 184, 
at 556-58. 
 
188
 Whaley v. Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1117 (6th Cir. 1995) (due process claim sustained 
for unauthorized removal of eyes and corneas pursuant to a state presumed consent statute); 
Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 481-84 (same). 
 
189
 Accord Brotherton, 923 F.2d 477; Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 796-
97 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that “parents had property interests in the corneas of their deceased 
children protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). The Newman court 
recognized that “common law rights, combined with the statutory right to control the disposition of 
the body recognized in each state’s adoption of the UAGA” supported the conclusion that a 
protectable property interest existed. Id. at 796. While here there are certainly enough “sticks,” or 
rights to constitute a “bundle of rights,” for some purposes, existence of property for all purposes is 
not clear. See supra note 179. Further, to the extent that the court relies on common law rights of the 
“next of kin,” such analysis, while applicable to Micheline’s action for relief, may exclude Moore. 
See supra Part II.A.1. Finally, other courts have come to opposite conclusions. See cases infra note 193. 
 
190
  923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 
191
 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.60(B)(3)-(4) (1999). 
 (B) A county coroner who performs an autopsy . . . may remove one or both corneas of 
the decedent, or a coroner may authorize a deputy coroner . . . to enucleate eyes, or eye 
technician to remove one or both corneas of a decedent whose body is the subject of an 
autopsy . . . if all of the following apply: 
 . . . . 
(3) The removal of the corneas and gift to the eye bank do not alter a gift made by the 
decedent or any other person authorized under this chapter to an agency or organization 
other than the eye bank; 
(4) The coroner, at the time he removes or authorizes the removal of the corneas, has no 
knowledge of an objection to the removal by any of the following: 
(a) The decedent, as evidenced in a written document executed during his 
lifetime; 
(b) The decedent’s spouse; . . . . 
Id. 
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process protection.192 Other courts have gone the opposite direction, 
however, as in the case of Arnaud v. Odom, concluding that “quasi-
property” interests are not actionable under the Due Process Clause of 
the Constitution.193 
Even assuming that courts are willing to recognize that either 
Moore or Micheline holds a property interest sufficient for due process 
purposes,194 it is not guaranteed that the deprivation constitutes a 
violation of due process.195 A three-part balancing test was developed by 
the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge to determine whether the 
process provided by the state accompanying a deprivation of property is 
sufficient.196 In determining whether the process is sufficient, the court 
weighs: (1) the private interest; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation by 
the current procedures and the value of additional procedural safeguards; 
and (3) the state’s interest, including additional burdens that may be 
imposed by alternate or additional procedural requirements.197  
The court in Brotherton found that the state pre-deprivation 
process was insufficient and that the state interest in organ procurement 
did not outweigh plaintiff’s property interest in the deceased.198 
Alternatively, in a pre-Eldridge decision, the Florida Supreme Court, 
while ultimately resting the decision on the lack of property interests 
afforded to the decedents’ next of kin, found that a substantially similar 
“presumed consent” statute199 was constitutional because the statute 
promoted a permissible state objective under Florida law and affected a 
very limited private interest.200  
  
 
192
 Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482. The court noted that although the property interest was 
extremely regulated, the rights granted under the UAGA create a substantial interest by plaintiff in 
the decedent’s body. Id. Whether such interest is devisable to plaintiffs such as Moore under the 
UAGA remains an open question. See discussion of conversion supra Part II.A.1. 
 
193
 870 F.2d 304, 307 (5th Cir. 1989). In Odom, defendant coroner performed an 
“experiment” on the corpses of two babies who had died of sudden infant death syndrome. Id. at 
307. He dropped the baby corpses on their heads to determine the extent of the damage resulting 
from the falls in order to clear his name in a previous lawsuit. Id. The court held that despite 
Louisiana’s recognition of a “quasi-property” right in a corpse, such a right was not actionable under 
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 310; see also Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 484 (J. 
Joiner dissenting) (“[T]he court is wrong in its holding that the procedural requisites for dealing with 
non-property can rise to become property and be protected by the fourteenth amendment [sic] . . . . 
[T]he ‘bundle of rights’ in the plaintiff, in light of the common law history and the express purpose 
of the [UAGA and presumed consent] statutes, is virtually nonexistent.”); State v. Powell, 497 So. 
2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1986) (finding no protected property interest while also noting the minor 
intrusion of corneal removal). 
 
194
 See Part II.A.1; see also supra notes 187-189, 193.  
 
195
 Deprivations of liberty and property are effectuated on a daily basis without due 
process violations. For example, when taxes are raised, debts owed to the government are collected, 
fines are levied, land is zoned for particular uses, or prisoners are convicted and sentenced. 
 
196
 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 
197
 Id. 
 
198
 923 F.2d at 482. 
 
199
 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.5185 (West 2002). 
 
200
 Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1191-92 (weighing the significant benefits of the statutory 
scheme against the minor cost and intrusion upon the families of the deceased in concluding that the 
statute achieves a permissible purpose). 
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Micheline and Moore are faced with two difficult challenges. 
Even assuming the presence of state action, Moore and Micheline must 
prevail in the Eldridge balancing test. Moore appears to have a 
substantially stronger private interest than Micheline, as the corneas were 
left to him, although even a widow’s rights may be enforced under the 
Due Process Clause.201 The state also has a substantial interest in the 
welfare of its citizens, and pre-deprivation process defeats the purpose of 
the statute and will impose an additional burden on the state. Secondly, it 
is by no means clear that Moore and Micheline have established a 
property interest at all under the common law or otherwise.202 A final 
barrier to recovery that goes beyond establishing a constitutional 
violation is what that recovery would look like. As in actions for 
conversion, the proper measure of recovery for organs and other body 
parts in a due process case presents thorny remedial issues.203 In sum, the 
slight advantage of avoiding state law immunities204 by bringing a claim 
under the Due Process Clause is effectively nullified by the legal and 
pragmatic limitations faced by plaintiffs like Micheline and Moore. 
2.  Takings Clause Claims 
Moore and Micheline may argue that the taking of Connery’s 
corneas constitutes a taking of private property by the government.205 
One modern justification for actions under the Takings Clause flows 
from the concept that burdens that are disproportionately placed on 
individuals by the government for the benefit of the public should be 
internalized by the government and borne by those who benefit, rather 
than the individual.206 This conception of takings policy conflicts directly 
with the policy of presumed consent laws, where the government 
appropriates corporeal property for public use without any 
compensation.207 Thus, the principal and familiar question facing 
  
 
201
  Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482. 
 
202
 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 
203
 See supra Part II.A.1, 3. 
 
204
 See supra note 174. 
 
205
 U.S. CONST. amend. V. While the text of the Takings Clause is found in the Fifth 
Amendment and was originally intended as a restriction on the federal government, the application 
of the Takings Clause to the states has been upheld and repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. 
See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
 
206
 Serkin, supra note 11 at 703-29 (surveying a variety of competing theories of takings 
beginning with the traditional economic account of forcing internalization of costs to effectuate 
efficiency and thereby “prevent[ing] fiscal illusion”). 
 
207
 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). The Supreme Court in Kelo found 
the Public Use requirement of the Takings Clause to be satisfied where a municipality condemned 
property for the purpose of conveying such property to a private developer in order to aid the local 
economy. Id. at 472. While the holding may be seen as a liberal interpretation of Public Use, the 
Supreme Court in Kelo makes clear that there are substantive limits to the clause, specifically noting 
that “it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose 
of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.” Id. at 477. 
Once again, making the liberal assumption that Moore or Micheline holds a property interest in 
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potential organ litigants is whether property in a corpse exists and, if so, 
whose property is it? The Supreme Court, in the area of Takings Clause 
jurisprudence, has stated, “We have never held that a physical item is not 
‘property’ simply because it lacks a positive or economic market 
value.”208 Although the Supreme Court’s view of property for purposes of 
the Takings Clause may be more restrictive than under due process 
analysis,209 excluding certain statutory entitlements, property interest in 
organs may be cognizable as one of the traditional forms of property 
entitled to Takings Clause protection.210  
One of the narrowest instances of property found by the Supreme 
Court to merit Takings Clause protection is found in the case of Hodel v. 
Irving.211 In Hodel, the statutory elimination of the right to devise 
property interests in Indian land was held to constitute a taking of 
property,212 despite the fact that, viewing rights to the property as a 
whole, a restriction on its disposition may seem insignificant.213 Viewing 
the taking as a complete taking of the right to devise one’s property, 
however, leads to the conclusion that the government has completely 
taken that property right away.214 One could argue that where the 
government prevents Connery and Micheline from enforcing their wishes 
  
Connery’s organs, it would appear that taking such property is a clear violation of the Public Use 
doctrine, “conferring a private benefit on a particular private party.” Id. at 479. However, viewed in 
the aggregate, as the Supreme Court viewed New London’s action, the taking of Connery’s organs 
may properly be viewed as serving the permissible public purpose of providing more organs to 
donees generally. Id. But see id. at 478 (noting that the “[c]ity’s development plan was not adopted 
to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
208
 Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 169 (1998). 
 
209
 See Jaffe, supra note 184 at 556-58. But see Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the 
Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (noting that the right to exclude is the sine qua 
non of property rights). 
 
210
 See Jaffe, supra note 184, at 556-58 (distinguishing statutory entitlements as “new 
property” under the Due Process Clause, not protected by the Takings Clause). Perhaps the 
traditional form of property protected by the Takings Clause is better understood as rights arising 
from the common law rather than statutory entitlements. See supra Part I.A; see also Andrus v. 
Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (no regulatory takings protection for effective destruction of market 
value through a prohibition on sale of chattel); Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1027-28 (1992) (preserving the Andrus exception, and noting the important status of land under the 
Takings Clause). 
 
211
 481 U.S. 704 (1987). 
 
212
 Id. at 718. 
 
213
 Only undivided interests of less than two percent fell under the regulation. Id. at 709. 
 
214
 This sleight of hand demonstrates the problem of conceptual severance in Takings 
Clause jurisprudence. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17 n.7. Also referred to as the “denominator 
problem,” conceptual severance merely embodies the idea that where the government takes 5% of a 
parcel of land for example, the loss is thought of as 100% loss of 5% of the property, as opposed to a 
5% loss of the parcel as a whole. JESSE DUKEMINER ET AL., PROPERTY 989 (6th ed. 2006). The 
Supreme Court has not established a firm standard to determine at what level of generality the taking 
of property should be examined, although the opinion in Lucas suggests that generally the inquiry is 
made “in light of total value of the takings claimant’s other holdings in the vicinity.” Lucas, 505 
U.S. at 1017 n.7. Should the court view the literal severance and subsequent pilfering of Connery’s 
kidney as a small loss to Micheline, who retains possession of the rest of his body, or as a complete 
loss to Moore, who held only an interest in Connery’s kidney? 
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to direct a donation,215 the government has taken that proprietary right 
away, and that compensation must be made.216  
Interests in organs are not interests in land, however, and Hodel 
appears to be a somewhat sui generis approach to Takings that may not 
extend to organs.217 In the case of Andrus v. Allard, the Supreme Court 
found that no taking had occurred where a government regulation 
preventing the sale of eagle feathers extinguished the economic value of 
plaintiff’s beautiful collection of eagle feathers.218 Importantly, the owner 
of the feathers still retained a possessory interest and merely lost the right 
to sell his property.219 When the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council found a complete wipeout of the economic 
value of land to constitute a taking, it specifically exempted chattel from 
this protection, citing Andrus, thereby elevating the level of protection 
afforded to real property.220 Organs are likely to be treated as chattel and 
thus subject to broad regulation without real danger of Takings Clause 
concerns.221 However, unlike Andrus, where the plaintiff retained 
physical possession of his feathers and the right to bequeath his feathers 
upon his death, for Connery, Moore, and Micheline, the government has 
appropriated every twig in the bundle.222 
Given the complete lack of property rights in organs retained by 
Moore and Micheline, and assuming that at one point such rights vested 
in Moore and Micheline,223 the strongest argument for a valid Takings 
claim would be based on the fact that the government has effectuated a 
permanent physical occupation of private property.224 Using a more 
traditional approach to Takings, the Supreme Court has adopted a per se 
  
 
215
 See supra note 41 (exploring issues of testamentary disposition generally as well as 
under the UAGA). 
 
216
 Hodel, 481 U.S. at 718. 
 
217
 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978) (rejection of 
proposals to construct a high-rise held to not be a taking); see also note 214 (discussing conceptual 
severance). 
 
218
 444 U.S. 51, 67-68 (1979) (no regulatory takings protection for effective destruction of 
market value through a prohibition on sale of chattel). 
 
219
 See supra note 214 (discussing conceptual severance of Connery’s kidneys). 
 
220
 Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992) (preserving the 
Andrus exception and noting the important status of land under the Takings Clause). 
 
221
 See Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 563 (1924) (statute prohibiting sale of 
liquors manufactured before passage of the statute is not a taking in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment); Jacob Ruppert, Inc. v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 302-03 (1920) (A statutory ban on “non-
intoxicating” alcoholic beverages “on hand at the time of the passage of the act” was similarly 
upheld against a takings challenge where “there was no appropriation of private property, but merely 
a lessening of value due to a permissible restriction imposed upon its use.”); see also Andrus, 444 
U.S. at 64-68; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 664 (1887). 
 
222
 Andrus, 444 U.S. at 63-64. Here, Connery’s corneas did not remain in the possession 
of Micheline and Moore, as the cornea(s) were implanted in another donee. Of course it is arguable 
that Micheline never had any right to maintain possession of Connery’s corneas, except perhaps for 
the limited purpose of burial or donation, while Moore has a stronger claim that the government took 
his rights to permanent possession. See supra Parts I.A, II.A.1. 
 
223
 See supra Parts I.A, II.A.1. 
 
224
 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982). 
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rule that a permanent physical occupation of property requires 
compensation under the Constitution.225 Therefore, when the government 
takes an organ or tissue from a corpse for implantation or other public 
use, the government has arguably effectuated a permanent occupation of 
that organ.226  
It seems that a taking of property in this context is 
straightforward, despite the lack of precedent in the context of organs, 
and that the physical taking of Connery’s organs goes beyond regulation 
of chattel.227 Of course, the claim fundamentally depends upon the liberal 
assumption that property exists in organs to begin with.228 Just as courts 
have avoided conversion and due process claims based on a failure to 
find property rights in organs, there is no reason to believe a takings 
claim would fare any better. Further, even if a court did seriously 
entertain the proposition of a takings claim, the constitutional remedy of 
“just compensation”229 presents a host of complicated issues that would 
deter most courts from wading into that dismal swamp.230  
In sum, Moore and Micheline’s claims under the Takings and 
Due Process Clauses provide a very narrow opportunity for meaningful 
relief. Previous impediments to recovery due to a lack of property in the 
body, as well as remedial concerns, are further complicated by new 
impediments. These added barriers to recovery include a state action 
requirement, a balancing test for due process claims, and the unclear 
application of takings jurisprudence traditionally applied to real property 
as opposed to chattel. Moore and Micheline’s constitutional claims, as 
  
 
225
 Id. at 434-36. The invasion in Loretto was merely the installation of hardware 
associated with cable television hook-ups. Id. at 421-22. Under the permanent physical occupation 
test, any invasion is compensable, thus resolving the persistent denominator problem. Id. at 435 
(Where permanent physical occupation is present, “the government does not simply take a single 
strand from the bundle of property rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every 
strand.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
226
 Certainly the government has no plans to return the organ upon death of the recipient. 
However, the government may assert a variety of traditional Takings Clause defenses to avoid 
liability for the removal of body parts pursuant to a presumed consent statute. See Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922) (where regulation results in a reciprocity of advantage, no 
taking has occurred); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915) (nuisance prevention is 
within the purview of state police power and not a taking). These and other defenses to takings seem 
inapplicable where it is difficult to characterize maintaining the ocular integrity of a corpse as a 
nuisance and any reciprocity of advantage, presumably premised on a theory that the next of kin may 
have more organs in the future, seems far too remote. 
 
227
 See supra note 221 (citing cases regulating chattel). 
 
228
 See Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985); Tillman 
v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); see also supra note 210. 
 
229
 Jaffe, supra note 32, at 571-72 (discussing potential solutions to the takings 
compensation problem, including, but not limited to: (1) fair market value where such market exists; 
(2) intrinsic value of the tissue being removed; (3) compensation for emotional distress suffered by 
the next of kin; and (4) recourse to the law of conversion); see also supra Part II.A.3; Kirby Forest 
Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 n.14 (1984) (suggesting alternative means of just 
compensation may be available under certain circumstances). At the very least, nominal damages 
may be awarded in Takings Clause claims. See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 424-25 (noting that the 
New York Court of Appeals affirmed compensation for the taking in question at $1).  
 
230
 See supra Part II.A.3. 
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well as all other possible claims previously discussed, are inadequate. 
Moore and Micheline are ultimately left with no adequate remedy for 
their tragic situation, and therefore, despite their reasonable belief to the 
contrary, Moore and Micheline have no rights.  
III.  AN ORGAN RIGHTS CRISIS 
The relevance of Micheline and Moore’s unique situation to the 
broader issues of organ donation may not be immediately clear, and 
many would suggest that their claims are largely irrelevant to the organ 
donation crisis in the United States.231 However, the broad lack of 
enforceable legal remedies for directed donations leads to inefficiencies 
and undermines the integrity of the organ donation system.232 Providing 
meaningful remedies to donors, donees, and their families would be an 
effective approach to increasing the supply of willing donors and the 
availability of organs generally, particularly in the context of directed 
donations, a growing, and increasingly important source for much 
needed organs.233 Accordingly, resolving Micheline and Moore’s 
problem is increasingly important to those who now need organs or who 
may need them in the future.234 
A. The Problem 
Organ shortages have reached epidemic proportions with an 
average of seventeen people dying daily, waiting in vain for needed 
organs, while every day we bury enough organs to keep those people 
alive.235 The regulatory approach in the United States relies almost 
completely on altruism, forbidding the sale or exchange of organs for 
“valuable consideration.”236 Despite the good intentions of American 
legislators, the gap between supply and demand increases daily.237 
  
 
231
 Dina Mishra, ‘Tis Better to Receive: The Case for an Organ Donee’s Cause of Action, 
25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 403, 405 (2007). 
 
232
 Colavito II, 438 F.3d 214, 228 (2d. Cir. 2006) (noting Mrs. Colavito’s statement that 
“if [she] would have known [she] couldn’t give Colavito both kidneys, [she] would have buried the 
other one in the ground with [her] husband”).  
 
233
  See infra Part III.B. 
 
234
 Mishra, supra note 231, at 410-11. 
 
235
 Sean Arthurs, No More Circumventing the Dead: The Least-Cost Model Congress 
Should Adopt to Address the Abject Failure of our National Organ Donation Regime, 73 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1101, 1101 (2005); see also National Kidney Foundation, 25 Facts About Organ Donation and 
Transplantation, ¶ 2, http://www.kidney.org/news/newsroom/printfact.cfm?id=30 (last visited Sept. 
13, 2008); McIntosh, supra note 9, at 185 (“Although the number of potential cadaveric donors each 
year is difficult to estimate, studies often find that number could provide enough transplant organs to 
meet or exceed the demand.”). 
 
236
 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 10, 8A U.L.A. 62 (2003). 
 
237
 REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (amended 2007), Prefatory Note, available at 
http://anatomicalgiftact.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=1&tabid=63 (last visited Mar. 8, 2009); 
see also United Network for Organ Sharing, www.unos.org (maintaining a running total of organ 
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Numerous governmental and non-profit organizations238 have had 
varying but limited success in attempting to address the organ shortage 
through public awareness and emotive appeals to altruistic donors.239 
Ethical concerns over selling body parts and the rich harvesting organs 
from the poor prevent serious consideration of changes in the current 
altruistic approach to organ donation.240 The debate at its core is one 
between ethics and efficiency.241 
The marketplace both here and abroad has responded to the 
organ supply shortage through a domestic black market in organ sales242 
and the quasi-legal emergence of “transplant tourism,” where those in 
desperate need of organs travel to foreign markets to purchase necessary 
organs.243 A wide variety of alternative solutions have been explored and 
implemented with varying degrees of success in a variety of foreign 
jurisdictions.244 Some of these approaches include broader presumed 
consent laws,245 an opt-out rather than opt-in model,246 harvesting organs 
from death row prisoners,247 and even a regulated free-market system.248 
Despite the successes of these alternative methods, given the firm policy 
of altruism in the UAGA it is unlikely that there will be any significant 
shifts in the current legislative scheme.249 
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visited Mar. 8, 2009) (acknowledging that at this time there is no consensus to alter the policy of 
altruism underlying the UAGA). 
 
241
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Aside from fueling black markets and transplant tourism,250 self-
interest is generating new schemes that conform to current legislation to 
remedy the organ deficit.251 Those in need of organs, or even those who 
are concerned that they may one day need an organ but are unsatisfied 
with the current system of allocation, may seek to avail themselves of the 
benefits of an alternative donation scheme.252 Among these alternatives is 
the relatively recent development of paired organ exchanges,253 where 
problems of incompatibility between a willing donor and donee are 
resolved by agreements between pairs of donors with similar 
compatibility problems.254 These paired-exchanges are gaining traction 
and even endorsement from the Department of Health and Human 
Services.255 Other non-profit organizations such as LifeSharers use 
directed donations under the UAGA to give preference to its members, 
who all agree to direct donations of their organs to donees within the 
organization’s membership.256  
Given the current growth rate of these institutions and the 
unlikelihood of drastic changes in organ donation law, directed donation 
will become an increasingly important element of organ distribution, and 
therefore, resolving situations like those presented to Moore and 
Micheline becomes increasingly important.257 The potential advantages 
created by directed donations generate incentives for broadening 
innovative private ventures, ultimately resulting in an increased number 
of potential donors and mutually beneficial transactions.258 However, 
  
Should Adopt to Address the Abject Failure of our National Organ Donation Regime, 73 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1101 (2005) (surveying the reasons why the United States will not change its approach). But 
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250
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251
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such beneficial activity is undermined by the current lack of clarity in the 
law on whether these organizations and procedures involve rights which 
may or may not be enforceable.259 Current uncertainty surrounding rights 
associated with organs also has the potential to deter would-be donors 
from participating in alternative organ donation programs and 
undermines the very foundational assumptions upon which these 
organizations are established.260 Indeed, any potential donor may be 
deterred from making a directed donation where there is no guarantee 
that a donor’s wishes will be respected.261 
B.  The Solution 
The shortage of organs in the United States is not due to a lack of 
supply, but rather to a tragically inefficient allocation of resources.262 It is 
evident from the creative use of directed donations (and even from the 
morally questionable, international free-market systems) that there is 
substantial empirical evidence that increasing property rights in 
cadaveric organs leads to an increasingly efficient allocation of 
resources.263 The benefits of alternative organ donation programs are the 
direct result of self-interested individuals efficiently allocating their 
limited property rights in their organs.264 While it is clear to most that a 
balance between efficiency and ethics is the best course,265 it is equally 
clear that the current approach is improperly calibrated towards the latter, 
at the expense of the former, and shifting the balance incrementally 
towards increased protection of property rights in the body could save 
many lives. 
Currently, Moore and Micheline’s remedies are simply 
inadequate, calling into question whether any rights to a properly 
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donated organ exist at all.266 The solution, where the donation crisis is 
understood as an inefficient allocation of organs stemming from poorly 
defined rights in the body,267 is to broaden the scope of those rights, 
which is achieved by broadening the protection afforded those rights 
through providing meaningful remedies for violations.268 Rights to 
cadaveric organs in the form of remedies may be found either through 
legislative action or the courts under the common law. 
The most effective, and difficult, solution to the uncertain nature 
of property interests in cadaveric organs lies with the legislature. Indeed, 
changing the law is always a seductive response to problems with the 
status quo, but making broad-sweeping changes to the altruistic model is 
not a realistic goal.269 Less drastic changes are more likely to succeed, 
and commentators have suggested narrow legislative causes of action for 
donees and their families.270 Indeed, several state legislatures have 
limited the immunities granted under the UAGA.271 While this may seem 
to be a minor change, it nonetheless strengthens Moore’s and 
Micheline’s property rights with respect to Connery’s organs and, 
additionally, it gives one reason to hope that the legislature can effectuate 
change in this area of law.272 However, given the states’ inaction with 
respect to the adoption of the 1987 UAGA273 and the uncertain future of 
the largely inconsequential changes proposed by the 2006 UAGA, any 
real legislative changes in the rights to organs are certainly not 
imminent.274 
A more plausible solution may lie within the the courts. Were 
courts simply to broaden current common law protections of property in 
the body generally and, more specifically, grant property in cadaveric 
organs, remedies under existing common law causes of action could be 
provided for Moore and Micheline.275 Just as a court responded to the 
increased value of cadavers in the nineteenth century,276 the common law 
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should be responsive to the demand and increased value of cadaveric 
organs,277 even if such remedies are an extension of legal fictions created 
for plaintiffs to recover damages.278 Unfortunately, neither the courts nor 
the legislature seem interested in taking steps to ensure the enforcement 
of the rights purportedly granted279 under the UAGA280 or the inherent 
rights to corporeal property.281 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The real world impact of increasing property interests in 
cadaveric organs cannot be guaranteed,282 and fact patterns such as that of 
Moore and Micheline seem, admittedly and thankfully, very unlikely and 
abnormal.283 What is certain, however, is that the current organ donation 
system in the United States is insufficient to meet the growing demand 
for organs.284 Current public policy surrounding organ donation is intent 
on preserving altruistic intent of donations,285 and many commentators 
have defended the scheme on those grounds.286 Others recognize that 
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insistence on altruistic motives to produce effective results in an 
American, free-market culture is naïve and ineffective.287 This Note 
proposes a compromise among competing views, suggesting that a 
simple and effective step towards resolving the organ crisis would be for 
the law to provide a means of enforcement to protect, and thereby 
expand, the minimal rights that have been granted under the current 
regulatory framework for organ donation.288  
This source of protection may arise from the legislature, 
common law, or the Constitution; however, it is important to recognize 
that the technical logistics of extending and enforcing the rights of 
plaintiffs like Moore and Micheline is tangential to the recognition that 
increased rights in cadaveric organs will save lives. The current lack of 
remedies available to protect rights in cadaveric organs should be a 
pressing concern for the courts, legislatures, everyone who now needs an 
organ, and everyone who might need an organ in the future. Increased 
protection of rights in cadaveric organs will have a positive effect on 
organ donation as a whole and could save Sir Roger Moore’s life. 
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